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A FAMILIAR CROSSROADS: MCGIRT V.
OKLAHOMA AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW CANON
By Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely* and Stacy L. Leeds**

Federal Indian law forms part of the bedrock of American
jurisprudence. Indeed, critical parts of the pre-civil war
constitutional canon were defined in Federal Indian law cases that
simultaneously provided legal justification for American westward
expansion onto unceded Indian lands. As a result, Federal Indian
law makes up an inextricable part of American rule of law. Despite
its importance, Federal Indian law follows a long and circuitous
road that requires “wander[ing] the maze of Indian statutes and
case law tracing back [over] 100 years.” That road has long
oscillated between two poles, with the Supreme Court sometimes
applying foundation principles that view tribes as sovereigns
“retaining all their original natural rights,” and at other times
treating tribes as mere “wards subject to a [self-imposed]
guardian.”
The Supreme Court’s respect for tribal sovereignty and self-
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determination reached its zenith in the so-called “modern era” of
Federal Indian law, spanning from 1959 through the late 1970s.
During this era, the Court tended to adhere to federal Indian
jurisprudence and solidified a relatively coherent doctrine based
upon the foundation principles developed in the 1830s. The late
Dean David Getches described the modern era as a time that
“encouraged a reinvigoration of tribal governments throughout
the country. During this period, tribes gained political influence
and economic security as [the federal government] generally
promoted a policy of tribal self-determination.”
The Court turned away from its foundation Indian law principles
with the onset of the 1980s, and the departure intensified as Chief
Justice William Rehnquist was appointed chief justice in 1986.
Since then, the touchstone of the Supreme Court’s federal Indian
jurisprudence has been to employ a “subjectivist” approach
whereby it “gauges tribal sovereignty as a function of changing
conditions”—demographic, social, political, and economic—and
the expectations of non-Indians that may be potentially impacted
by the exercise of tribal power. These cases have invariably
involved fear-based concerns that a decision in favor of the tribes
will alter the settled balance of power between tribes, states, and
non-Indians
As a result, the Supreme Court became a strikingly hostile place
for American Indian tribes as the Court became increasingly
willing to divest tribes of governmental powers, not by upholding
the enactments of Congress, but through its own interpretation of
what tribal inherent governmental rights ought to be.
The appointment of Justice Sonia Sotomayor and, more recently,
Justice Neil Gorsuch seems to have brought change to the Court’s
direction in Indian law cases. Since then, cases have been
consistently decided in favor of tribal litigants by reaffirming
treaty rights through the application of foundation principles that
focus on the plain language of treaties and the application of the
Indian law canons of construction. However, to be sure, even the
Rehnquist Court did “recite[] and sometimes act[] upon
foundation principles,” but those cases were limited to situations
where “non-Indian interests [were] not seriously threatened.” All
of Indian Country waited for, or perhaps dreaded, a true litmus
test.
That test came to the Supreme Court in the form of two Indian law
cases—Sharp v. Murphy and McGirt v. Oklahoma—both of which
were framed by non-Indian parties to affect the interests of an
estimated 1.8 million people in the eastern half of Oklahoma.
Ready or not, Indian Country found its test case, which squarely
placed the Court’s competing jurisprudential philosophies—its
foundation principles and its “subjectivist” approach—on a
collision course.
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In a powerful and uncharacteristically passionate decision,
Justice Gorsuch wrote for a 5-4 majority, upholding treaty-based
rights to re-recognize the historic reservation boundaries of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, the fourth largest Indigenous nation in
the United States. The decision was the fourth consecutive treatyrights victory and seemed to solidify a shift toward a consistent
approach rooted in foundation principles.
The victory could be short-lived. Just weeks after the Court’s
decision in McGirt, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away,
once again shifting the make-up of the United States Supreme
Court. As a result, Federal Indian law once again finds itself at a
crossroads. The Murphy and McGirt decisions are landmark
decisions that bring change to the legal landscape of much of
Oklahoma. It remains to be seen whether the perceived new
Supreme Court era in Indian law is here to stay.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Bad facts make bad law,” and the Five Tribes1 now situated in eastern
Oklahoma—the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Cherokee Nation, Seminole Nation,
Choctaw Nation, and Chickasaw Nation—could not have asked for a worse set of
facts as they set out to protect their political sovereignty and the territorial integrity
of their homelands. In 1999, Patrick Dwayne Murphy, a citizen of the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation, brutally murdered another Muscogee (Creek) Nation citizen.2 Just a
few years before, Jimcy McGirt, a citizen of the Seminole Nation, committed an
unspeakable sex crime against a child.3 Both crimes involved Indian defendants and
took place inside Indian country, within the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation—a permanent homeland the United States had “solemnly guaranteed” to the
Creek Nation in 1832 in what was then known as Indian Territory, now present-day
Oklahoma.4 Both defendants were tried and convicted in Oklahoma state courts.5
McGirt received a sentence that ensured life imprisonment;6 Murphy was sentenced
to death.7
1. Historic and legal documents refer to the “Five Civilized Tribes” when collectively referring to
the Indigenous nations that were relocated to Indian Territory, now eastern Oklahoma. For purposes of
this article, the authors will use the formal names of each Indigenous nation names and “Five Tribes”
when making a collective reference.
2. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 904–05 (10th Cir. 2017).
3. Order Affirming Denial of Application for Post-Conviction Relief at 1, McGirt v. Oklahoma
(Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2019) (No. PC-2018-1057) [hereinafter McGirt, Order Denying Relief].
McGirt was convicted of First-Degree Rape by Instrumentation, Lewd Molestation, and Forcible Sodomy.
Id.
4. Treaty with the Creeks art. 14, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366.
5. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 905; McGirt, Order Denying Relief, supra note 3, at 1.
6. Specifically, McGirt received two sentences of five hundred years imprisonment for the first two
crimes and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the third. McGirt, Order Denying Relief,
supra note 3, at 1. The sentences were set to be served consecutively. Id.
7. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 905.
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Both appealed and later filed applications for post-conviction relief, arguing
that the Oklahoma state courts lacked criminal jurisdiction over their cases.8 The
argument was a straight-forward application of the federal Major Crimes Act.9 That
Act provides for federal court jurisdiction, exclusive of the states,10 to try Indian
defendants for certain “major crimes” (including murder and rape) when such crimes
occur within, among other areas, Indian Reservations.11 According to Jimcy McGirt,
the argument was simple:
The facts in evidence show that (1) Petitioner is a federally
recognized [tribal] member . . . ; (2) the alleged crimes were . . .
within the federally recognized boundaries of the [Muscogee
Creek] Nation of Oklahoma; (3) [the crime charged is] enumerated
within the Indian Major Crimes Act, under exclusive federal
jurisdiction; and (4) Oklahoma courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction; therefore the state convictions are void ab initio.12
Oklahoma’s position was equally simple: if Congress ever established any
“reservations” in Indian territory, then Congress had subsequently disestablished
those reservations, including the Muscogee (Creek) Nation where the crime occurred
(and also the Cherokee, Seminole, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations) in a series of
statutes culminating with Oklahoma statehood.13 Indeed, Oklahoma had spent the
past 113 years since statehood exercising general criminal jurisdiction over most of
the lands within the state in stark contrast to other states with Indian reservations
inside their borders. From this exercise of jurisdiction, Oklahoma reasoned, there are
no modern-day Indian reservations within eastern Oklahoma and therefore the
federal Major Crimes Act does not apply. As a result, the State argued that
Oklahoma, not the federal government, had exclusive jurisdiction over Murphy’s
and McGirt’s crimes.14
And just like that, the Five Tribes found themselves in a familiar yet
perilous circumstance where a case of utmost importance to their past, present and
future was presented to the United States Supreme Court, but no tribe initiated the
litigation. Instead, the Five Tribes were drawn into these precarious cases and—to
the extent their arguments rested on the continued existence of the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation reservation, as well as the continued recognition of their territorial-based
sovereignty—forced to join in a common cause with a convicted rapist and a
convicted murderer.
8. Id. See also McGirt, Order Denying Relief, supra note 3, at 1.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2019).
10. Some argue that the Act grants jurisdiction to the federal government over Indian defendants that
commit crimes inside Indian reservations regardless of whether the victim is an Indian or non-Indian. See,
e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978). The Act’s enumerated crimes now include murder;
manslaughter; kidnapping; maiming; incest; rape; an assault against an individual who has not attained
the age of 16 years; felony child abuse or neglect; arson; burglary; and robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 1153
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1151.
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, McGirt v. Oklahoma (U.S. April 17, 2019) (No. 18-9526),
2019 WL 7372927. See also Brief for Petitioner at 21, Carpenter v. Murphy (U.S. Sept. 19, 2018) (No.
17-1107), 2018 WL 4522427 [hereinafter Murphy, Brief for Petitioner].
13. See generally Murphy, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12.
14. See generally id.
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The stakes could not have been higher for Murphy and McGirt, whose very
personal lives were at stake, or for the Five Tribes, each fighting for on-going
recognition of their remaining homelands and accompanying right to territorialbased self-governance. Multiple treaties guaranteed distinct boundaries for each of
the Five Tribes and the modern governing documents of all Five Tribes incorporate
treaty boundaries as the territorial basis for their jurisdiction.15 Nonetheless, federal
court cases involving Indian tribes tend to take on a life of their own; a narrow set of
facts specific to a single tribal government is often generalized to result in sweeping
and detrimental precedent for all 574 federally recognized tribes. As a result, the Five
Tribes, each possessing a distinct historic, political, cultural and legal standing, could
share the same fate in a case that none initiated. Knowing this, the Five Tribes tread
lightly for years, hesitant to go on the offense to litigate their boundaries for fear that
a final blow to remaining treaty rights might be dealt by the United States Supreme
Court which may permanently preclude future claims16 and therefore obliterate rights
that the tribes hold sacred.
These cases also have a deeper meaning for Indian Country nationwide—
they serve as a bellwether for the Court’s Federal Indian law jurisprudence writ large.
From its inception, the “whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian
tribal power is marked by adherence to three underlying fundamental principles.”17
Those foundation principles provide that:
(1) [A]n Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the inherent
powers of any sovereign state; (2) a tribe’s presence within the
territorial boundaries of the United States subjects the tribe to
federal legislative power and precludes the exercise of external
powers of sovereignty of the tribe . . . but does not by itself affect
the internal sovereignty of the tribe; and (3) inherent tribal powers
are subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation of
Congress, but except as thus expressly qualified, full powers of
internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly
constituted organs of government.18
These foundation principles are not trivial. Instead, they are inextricably
intertwined with the foundation of the American rule of law.19 Indeed, the body of
15. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s constitution defines its political jurisdiction as the same
geographic area designated in 1900 pursuant to treaties with the United States. MUSKOGEE CONST. art. I,
§ 2. The Choctaw Nation’s constitution defines the nation as a geographic area with direct citation to the
Treaty of June 22, 1853 (11. Stat. 611). CHOCTAW NAT. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1983). The Cherokee Nation’s
constitution defines its territorial jurisdiction with direct citation to the fee patents of 1838 and 1846, as
only diminished by the Treaty of July 19, 1866 and the sale of the Cherokee Outlet. CHEROKEE NAT.
CONST. art. II. The Chickasaw Nation Constitution assigns the power of its judiciary to all cases arising
under the laws of the Chickasaw Nation pursuant to treaties made with the United States. CHICKASAW
NAT. CONST. amend. IV, § 2. The Seminole Nation’s constitution defines territorial jurisdiction consistent
with treaties. SEMINOLE NAT. OKLA. CONST. art. XV.
16. See, e.g., Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1046
(holding that the Osage Nation’s reservation had been disestablished).
17. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.02 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012).
18. Id.
19. See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1795, 1804 (2019).
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laws necessary to justify American expansion into Indian lands was a matter of such
importance to the nascent United States that it colored much of the Supreme Court’s
development of the pre-Civil War Constitutional canon.20 The Supreme Court has
largely remained faithful to these foundation principles for almost two-hundred
years; from Chief Justice John Marshall through the retirement of Justice Thurgood
Marshall.21
The rise of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice in 1986 resulted in an abrupt
turn away from foundation principles.22 That trend continued after Chief Justice John
Roberts took the helm in 2005.23 The touchstone of the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts’ federal Indian jurisprudence has been to ignore foundation principles and
instead employ a “subjectivist” approach whereby it “gauges tribal sovereignty as a
function of changing conditions— demographic, social, political, and economic—
and the expectations they create in the minds of affected non-Indians.”24 In 1996, the
late Dean David Getches noted three “new rules of judicial subjectivism:” (1) retreat
from the established canons of construction; (2) nineteenth-century allotment policy
as the touchstone for Congressional intent; and (3) fabrication of a “balancing of
interests” test that allows the justices to “reach outcomes consistent with their own
notions of how much tribal autonomy there ought to be.”25
The subjectivist approach has been the hallmark of the Federal Indian law
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court for the past thirty-plus years. Dean Getches
describes the Court’s recent Indian jurisprudence as the “new” subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian law.26 However, with the benefit of time, we can now see
that the Court’s more recent approach fits into a deeper pattern. Although “the whole
course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal power is marked by
adherence” to foundation principles, the Court has nonetheless moved away from
these ideals on a few occasions.27 During those times, the Court has retreated from
the principle that tribes are sovereigns “retaining all their original natural rights”28
and instead viewed tribes as “wards subject to a guardian.” 29 Despite being called
“new,” contemporary Supreme Court precedent fits nicely into this latter, albeit
invariably temporary, mold, concluding that tribes lack any powers “inconsistent
with their [dependent] status.”30
Change has seemingly come with the appointment of Justice Sonia
Sotomayor and, more recently, Justice Neil Gorsuch to the high bench. Since the
appointment of Justice Gorsuch the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of tribal

20. See id.
21. Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PUB.
LAND L. REV. PUB. 1, 7 (1995).
22. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996); see also Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 1.
23. See infra Part C.
24. Getches, supra note 22, at 1575.
25. Id. at 1620, 1622, 1626, 1628.
26. See id. at 1573.
27. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, at § 4.02.
28. Worcester v. Georgia, 35 U.S. 515, 555 (1832).
29. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 569 (1883).
30. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
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interests in all four cases that have come before it.31 Just as important as the result,
the Court—in Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den and Herrera v.
Wyoming—has sent strong signals that it plans to return to foundation principles.32
However, even the Rehnquist court occasionally would “recite[] and sometimes act[]
upon foundation principles,” where “non-Indian interests [were] not seriously
threatened.”33 Although critically important to the parties of Cougar Den and
Herrera, neither of those cases can be said to seriously threaten broad non-Indian
interests. Accordingly, it is not clear whether the Court’s recent decisions mark an
aberration or a true return to foundation principles.
Murphy and McGirt placed these competing philosophies—the Court’s
foundation principles and its “subjectivist” approach—on a collision course. As
recently as 2016 in Nebraska v. Parker, the Supreme Court—in an opinion authored
by Justice Clarence Thomas— reaffirmed the foundational principle that a strong
textual signal is necessary for the Court to find Congressional intention to
disestablish an Indian reservation.34 The Court also conspicuously undercut the value
of subsequent events as a marker of Congressional intent.35 However, unlike Parker,
Murphy and McGirt are alleged to affect the interests of an estimated 1.8 million
people in eastern Oklahoma36 and the metropolitan Tulsa area. Application of the
foundational disestablishment rubric would seem to predict a clear victory for tribes,
while application of the Court’s subjectivist approach would likely lead to a win for
the State of Oklahoma. The outcome, in other words, would be determined by which
philosophy the Court adopted.
The Court’s long-awaited37 decision on the final day of the 2019-2020 term
marked an atmospheric shift in the field of Federal Indian law.38 The decision seemed
to solidify a shift back to foundation principles in cases dealing with tribal treaty
rights, and a retreat from the Rehnquist Court’s version of Indian law. However, less

31. See Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S.Ct. 1686 (2019); Washington v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1832
(2018); Upper Skagit Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S.Ct. 1649 (2018).
32. Herrera, 139 S.Ct. at 1686; Washington St. Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S.Ct.
1000 (2018).
33. Getches, supra note 22, at 1576.
34. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1078–79 (2016).
35. Id. at 1082.
36. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Royal v. Murphy (U.S. Feb. 6, 2018) (No. 17-1107), 2018 WL
776368, [hereinafter Royal, Petition for Certiorari].
37. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit, the Murphy case was argued before the United States Supreme
Court on Nov. 27, 2018. Justice Gorsuch did not participate in the consideration or the decision of the
case. The Court did not issue a decision and the case was bound over for the following term. The Tenth
Circuit case was published on November 9, 2017. The resolution was tied to the McGirt decision with a
full court on July 9, 2020.
38. See Jonodev Chaudhuri, Reflection on McGirt v. Oklahoma, HARV. L. REV. FORUM (Nov. 20,
2020) https://harvardlawreview.org/2020/11/reflection-on-mcgirt-v-oklahoma/ [https://perma.cc/L59AP3LB]; Bregory Ablavsky, McGirt: Gorsuch Affirms “Rule of Law,” Not “Rule of the Strong” in Key
Federal
Indian
Law
Decision,
STAN.
L.
SCH.
BLOGS
(July
10,
2020)
https://law.stanford.edu/2020/07/10/mcgirt-gorsuch-affirms-rule-of-law-not-rule-of-the-strong-in-keyfederal-indian-law-decision/ [https://perma.cc/52L6-9J2B]; Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely and Monte Mills,
The Civil Jurisdiction Landscape in Eastern Oklahoma Post McGirt v. Oklahoma, ROCKY MOUNT.
MINERAL LAW FOUND. (August 2020) https://www.rmmlf.org/natural-resources-law-network/august2020 [https://perma.cc/H779-WFWT].
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than eighty days later, with the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a cloak of
uncertainty returned. The Court’s competing jurisprudential philosophies for Indian
law cases that seemed settled after McGirt, may continue to jockey for the supremacy
within the Court.
This article examines the recent history of Supreme Court jurisprudence in
the field of Federal Indian law, demonstrating the affect the Court’s subjectivist
approach has had on the canon. It then analyzes the McGirt and Murphy decisions,
contextualizing the shifting predictability for Federal Indian law cases before the
United States Supreme Court. This article concludes by recounting how these
decisions have recently played out in tribal, federal, and state courts in eastern
Oklahoma.
II.

A PRIMER ON THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE FIVE TRIBES

Although every Indigenous nation has a unique culture, the Five Tribes
share similar political and legal histories. They have simultaneously weathered
external pressures and responded to changes in their relationships with the United
States over the last three centuries, often in a solidarity of resistance. The Five Tribes
have collectively experienced cyclical highs and lows that have required them to
repeatedly rebuild their government institutions after near catastrophic events
ranging from settler invasion and disease to removal and relocation, forced allotment
of tribally controlled and regulated territories, and near political extinction.
Over much of the last 100 years, the United States interfered with the
internal governance of the Five Tribes to such a degree that Congress authorized the
President of the United States to install unelected Principal Chiefs of the Five Tribes
to execute deeds and other documents. Federal policy did not shift until 1970, when
Congress re-recognized the Five Tribes’ authority to elect their own leaders.39 From
that point forward, the Five Tribes’ modern history begins on the legal foundation
for federal law that was set forth in many treaties with the United States.
A.

Removal, Relocation and Post-Civil War Treaties

The Five Tribes had distinct, large territories in what would become the
southeastern United States, but after the United States revolution, non-Indian settlers
moved into these original territories and ancestral homelands.Pressures for more land
resulted in the Five Tribes’ territories being repeatedly redrawn to increasingly
smaller boundaries. By the early 1800s, each had agreed to several land cessions at
the threat of more violence, but the Five Tribes persevered by exercising autonomy
over the land and the people within their reduced territories.40

39. An Act to Authorize Each of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma to Select Their Principal
Officer, S. 3116, 91st Cong. (1970).
40. See generally J. MATTHEW MARTIN, THE CHEROKEE SUPREME COURT 1823–1835 (2020)
(discussing the exercise of jurisdiction by Cherokee judicial and law enforcement officers over Indians
and non-Indians alike within the reduced boundaries of the Cherokee Nation). See also STEVE INSKEEP,
JACKSONLAND: PRESIDENT ANDREW JACKSON, CHEROKEE CHIEF JOHN ROSS, AND THE GREAT
AMERICAN LAND GRAB, 210–216 (2015) (telling the story of Cherokee efforts to evict white families
living on Cherokee land).
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As tensions continued to escalate, non-Indian state and local powers
supported and emboldened settler encroachment. A frequent cycle played out: tribal
resistance led to state and federal retaliation, resulting in new agreements and the
slow but steady erosion of tribal land ownership, territorial dominion, and political
sovereignty, which, of course, led to more tribal resistance.41
The election of President Andrew Jackson proved a flashpoint for
intensified tensions and anti-Indian sentiment.42 Jackson had long played significant
roles in the dispossession of the Five Tribes. From 1814 to 1824, Jackson was
instrumental in negotiating several treaties that led to the divestiture of the Five
Tribes’ territory in Alabama, Florida, parts of Georgia, Tennessee, Mississippi,
Kentucky, and North Carolina.43 As President, Jackson signed the Indian Removal
Act of 183044 into law, enshrining the policy that would be directly responsible for
catastrophic loss to the Five Tribes, not just in terms of land ownership and control,
but also thousands of lives.
But the Indian Removal Act was not self-executing and instead, required
new treaties to be negotiated with tribes in order to effectuate tribal land cessions to
the United States in the east in exchange for new tribal territories owned by the Tribes
in the west. Most importantly, these land cessions and relocation efforts required
tribal consent. The Act set aside lands “west of the river Mississippi . . . for the
reception of such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange lands where
they now reside [east of the Mississippi], and remove from there.”45 If a tribe agreed
to remove from their original territory and homelands, the Act provided, “the United
States will forever secure and guaranty to them, and their heirs or successors, the
country so exchanged with them.”46 Should the Tribes decline to enter into treaty
negotiations for removal and relocation, the Tribes remained in their homelands to
deal with ever increasing hostility from the states and local settlers, potentially
needing to rely on the federal government to intervene on the Tribes’ behalf.
By the time the Indian Removal Act was passed, the Five Tribes no longer
possessed the requisite military strength to respond to non-Indian encroachment of
their lands, particularly if the United States military were to become involved.
Instead, the Tribes began asserting their rights to land and territory in the federal
courts, culminating in the United States Supreme Court decisions Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia47 and Worcester v. Georgia.48 These cases provided the following
foundation principles of Federal Indian law that continue to guide the modern
balance of power within the federal union: (1) inherent tribal powers are retained
absent a voluntarily cession of those powers by the Tribal Nation or unless expressly
extinguished by a specific Act of Congress; and (2) state laws have no force and

41. See INSKEEP, supra note 40 at 210–216.
42. See id. at 25.
43. See J. Stanford Hays, Twisting the Law: Legal Inconsistencies in Andrew Jackson’s Treatment of
Native-American Sovereignty and State Sovereignty, 21 J. SO. LEGAL HIST. 157, 159–60 (2013).
44. Indian Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
48. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832).
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effect inside Indian country, absent a delegation of federal authority by Congress
inviting state power to operate inside of Indian country.
These foundation principles further establish that as sovereigns, “[t]he
Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining all their original natural rights . . . from time immemorial.”49
As to the enforceability of inter-governmental agreements and the relationship of the
tribes to the United States, “the treaties and laws of the United States contemplate
the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provided that
all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the
union.”50 The Court situated Indigenous nations as retaining territorial integrity to
the exclusion of state governments as “distinct communit[ies], occupying [their] own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of [the states] can
have no force.”51
Although the Cherokee Nation’s legal victory was short lived as a practical
matter, with relocation to Indian Territory being complete by mid-1839, the
Cherokee cases continue to provide the legal framework for treaty-interpretation,
including the McGirt decision and other modern treaty-interpretation cases.52 To
legally effectuate removal and relocation, each of the Five Tribes entered into a
removal treaty53 outlining, as a matter of tribal and federal law, the conditions with
which the tribe “agreed” to be relocated to their current territories.54 At present, the
Five Tribes continue to incorporate these treaty guarantees as a matter of tribal law
in their primary governing documents, particularly as it relates to their territorial
boundaries.55
B.

Allotment and the Weaponization of Tribal Government Termination

The Five Tribes rebounded in their new home and rebuilt their
governmental institutions following relocation. In many ways, this time represents a
golden era for the Five Tribes, with governmental capacity expanding well-beyond
what existed in the pre-removal era. New national capitals were declared, townsites
were created, and each of the Five Tribes engaged in nation-building with emphasis
on legal, regulatory, and educational infrastructure. New constitutions were adopted,
legislative bodies passed laws, and each of the Five Tribes reconstituted its
government institutions.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 520.
52. See, e.g., Washington St. Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 1000 (2018); Herrera
v. Wyoming, 139 S.Ct. 1686 (2019).
53. But see Treaty with the Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478. This treaty, concluded at New
Echota, was not executed by duly elected Cherokee citizens. Instead, United States officials sought treaty
signatories that lacked official agency to sign on behalf of the Cherokee Nation.
54. See generally Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Feb 24, 1831, 7 Stat. 333 (Choctaw); Treaty with
the Seminole, May 9, 1832, 7 Stat. 368 (Seminole); Treaty of Cusseta, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366 (Creek);
Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee); Treaty of Pontotoc, Oct. 20, 1832, 7 Stat.
L., 381 (Chickasaw).
55. See supra note 15.

310

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51; No. 2

The Muscogee (Creek) Nation reestablished a constitutional form of
government providing for executive, legislative, and judicial branches.56 The
Constitution called for a bicameral legislative body that would make up the National
Council: House of King and House of Warriors.57 The executive branch was made
up of Principal Chief and Second Chief58 with executive veto powers59 and the power
to seat treaty delegates subject to National Council ratification.60
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the other Five Tribes’ governments were
well-known at the time for sophisticated and mature judiciaries exercising the full
array of civil and criminal jurisdiction.61 The Muscogee (Creek) Nation established
a police force called the Lighthorse, exercising territorial jurisdiction to enforce its
criminal code. A judicial branch was comprised of a High Court composed of five
judges62 exercising general jurisdiction, including criminal cases with a
constitutional right to legal counsel.63
Within Indian Territory, the Five Tribes maintained strong intergovernmental relationships, forming the Inter-Tribal Council in 1842, the United
Nations of Indian Territory in 1861, and the Inter-Tribal Council of the Five
Civilized Tribes (ITC) in 1949.64 These organizations addressed, among other things,
intertribal matters such as dual citizenship65 and shared criminal jurisdiction.66 In the
modern era, the Five Tribes continue to hold regular inter-tribal meetings of the
elected leaders.67
Following the U.S. Civil War, the United States and non-Indian settlers
renewed their previous push to acquire even more Indian lands.68 To facilitate access
to more land and create easier alienability for Indian lands, Congress ushered in a

56. See generally MUSKOGEE CONST. See also Woodward v. De Graffenried, 238 U.S. 284, 293–94
(1915).
57. MUSKOGEE CONST. art. I, § 1.
58. Id.
59. MUSKOGEE CONST. art. II, § 4.
60. MUSKOGEE CONST. art. X.
61. See Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Judicial Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis, 50 KAN. L.
REV. 473, 474–80 (2002).
62. MUSKOGEE CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
63. MUSKOGEE CONST. art. IX, § 2.
64. INTER-TRIBAL COUNCIL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, Inter-Tribal Council Formation (2021)
http://www.fivecivilizedtribes.org/Chapter-One.html [https://perma.cc/S6JC-8JL5].
65. See generally SHARON F. MOUSS, THE INTER-TRIBAL COUNCIL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES
(Suzanne Heard, ed., 1975).
66. Id.
67. The Inter-Tribal Council of the Five Civilized Tribes meets regularly to take up issues of joint
concern. See INTER-TRIBAL COUNCIL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, Meetings (2021)
http://www.fivecivilizedtribes.org [https://perma.cc/5GT2-PTGW].
68. The Five Tribes within Indian Territory were in an all too familiar situation. In the pre-removal
era, just decades before, the thirst for more land lead to devastating consequences for the Five Tribes’
property ownership and political power. Although prior treaty provisions promised federal intervention to
remove non-Indian settlers, the federal government was either unwilling or unable to stop the non-Indian
population flow into Indian Territory. Settlers disregarded proclamations by successive presidents
warning against non-Indian entry and occupation. See, e.g, Marlin v. Lewallen, 276 U.S. 58, 58, 61–62
(1928). See generally JEFFREY BURTON, INDIAN TERRITORY AND THE UNITED STATES 1866–1906:
COURTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE MOVEMENT FOR OKLAHOMA STATEHOOD (1995).
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new federal Indian policy with the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887.69
Because their lands were held in fee simple, the Five Tribes were initially exempt
from the General Allotment Act. Notwithstanding, similar laws were soon passed to
coerce the Five Tribes into agreeing to allotment of their lands in a process similar
to, but distinct from, other tribes across the United States.70
Like the 1830 Indian Removal Act before it, the various enactments of
allotment legislation were not self-executing and were not contemplated––or
enforceable at the time––as unilateral actions by the federal government. In response,
federal agents began seeking negotiations with each tribe, placing incalculable
pressure on tribal leadership to consent to allotment71 and make way for statehood.
Nationally, allotment accelerated significantly after the Supreme Court
decided Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.72 That decision marked the cession of the Supreme
Court’s role in Indian affairs for over half a century and solidified Congressional
“plenary” power over Indians, holding that:
We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the
dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the
legislative branch of the government exercised its best judgment
in the premises. In any event, as Congress possessed full power in
the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire the motives
which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury was
occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as implying, by
the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be sought by an
appeal to that body for redress and not to the courts.73
As a result, the Court concluded that the federal government has limitless
power to allot tribal lands over the objection of tribal governments, even if it meant
unilateral federal abrogation of prior treaty guarantees. Lone Wolf marks the low
water mark for Supreme Court Indian jurisprudence that had previously guarded
tribes from encroachment into internal tribal affairs. After Lone Wolf, Indian land
tenure and tribal land use laws would become subject to federal control, with or
without tribal consent.
Although the allotment policy dealt primarily with the transfer of lands,
federal policy at the time also intended wholesale assimilation of Indian people into
the American mainstream, including eventual United States citizenship. In fact, some
allotment agreements included the agreement that the tribal citizens would become
United States citizens once the land was allotted to the individual.
These allotment and assimilation policies were applied nationwide,
including on reservations located in federal territories as well as those located within
the boundaries of already-existing states. Proponents of this policy had several
reasons to support implementation. Foremost, critics of tribal self-governance
69. General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887).
70. Lands of many tribes were allotted under this law, but it expressly excluded the Five Tribes and
a few other Indian Territory tribes. Id. at § 8.
71. See generally WILLIAM T. HAGEN, TAKING INDIAN LANDS: THE CHEROKEE (JEROME)
COMMISSION 1889–93 (2003).
72. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
73. Id. at 568.
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characterized Indian reservations (regardless of whether owned by the United States
in trust for the benefit of a tribe, or, in the case of the Five Tribes, owned by the tribe
in fee with tribal laws to benefit surface ownership and use by tribal citizens) as
“communist” in nature.74 This criticism of tribal “communal” ownership was a major
factor in the federal push to allot lands in Indian Territory.75
Non-Indians likewise coveted tribal lands for their natural resources.
During the allotment era there were “frequent allusions to the [notion] that the
Indians were of course making no use of natural resources which should be
developed in the interests of civilization.”76 Whether an adequate description or not,
oil was to the allotment era what gold had been to Indian removal in the east. At the
time of allotment, tribal lands featured timber, lands suitable for grazing and game
preserves, oil reserves, and gas resources.77 Access to these resources, accelerated
non-Indian calls for removing tribal title through the allotment policy.
Although allotment was the federal policy goal, the path to allotment of the
Five Tribes’ lands was not clear because they owned their reservations in fee title.
Members of Congress doubted whether Congress “had any authority to interfere with
the rights of those Indians” in Indian Territory.78 Although the Supreme Court later
ruled that the federal government could achieve allotment with or without tribal
consent in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock79 and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,80 federal
officials remained concerned about the interrelationship between allotment and the
United States’ conveyances of the Five Tribes’ fee title to their lands. Federal
officials took the safer route by seeking allotment agreements that required tribal
officials to execute the deeds as an intra-tribal property transfer.81
To effectuate negotiations, Congress established the Commission to the
Five Civilized Tribes (Dawes Commission).82 Negotiations went on for more than a
decade and were only successful after the enactment of draconian laws that
threatened the continued governmental authority of the Five Tribes. The first such
law, “designed to coerce the tribes to negotiate with the Commission,” 83 was passed
in 1897 and provided that after January 1, 1898, the federal courts in Indian Territory
“shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction and authority to try and determine
all . . . criminal causes for the punishment of any offense committed” after that
date.84 The 1897 Act included, however, the qualification that any agreement with a
tribe, when ratified, would “operate to suspend any provisions of this Act if in

74. D. S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 11, 54–55 (1973).
75. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 434, 438 (1912). See also Woodward v. De Graffenried,
238 U.S. 284, 297, 305, 309 (1915).
76. OTIS, supra note 74, 17–18.
77. Id. at 22, 25.
78. 18 Cong. Rec. 191 (1886) (statement of Mr. Perkins).
79. 187 U.S. 294, 305 (1902).
80. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
81. Woodward v. De Graffenried, 238 U.S. 284, 294 (1915).
82. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612, 643–45.
83. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See also Act of June
7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 83.
84. 30 Stat. 62, 83.
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conflict therewith as to said nation.”85 Congress understood that the threat to abolish
exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over tribal citizens, together with this savings
clause, was “intended to drive them into an agreement with the Dawes Commission,
and if they do not agree to it, they shall get this terrible blow.”86
The Curtis Act,87 passed in 1898, contained similar threats to tribal judicial
authority and to the individual judges who could exercise tribal adjudicatory
authority. Section 28 threatened the abolishment of “all tribal courts in Indian
Territory” and the transfer of tribal court cases to the federal court. But the Act also
provided an escape clause for the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Muscogee (Creek)
Nations if they agreed to allotment.88 Allotment agreements were completed, subject
to ratification by tribal citizens by December 1, 1898. The Creek Agreement included
a provision that would have expressly protected Creek courts, but the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation citizens did not ratify the agreement by the deadline. Further, the
final allotment agreement provided that it was not to be construed to revive or
reestablish the Creek courts.89 The Muscogee (Creek) Nation judiciary was not
revived, legally or as a practical matter, until the completion of two federal lawsuits
in which the Muscogee (Creek) Nation won re-affirmation of their right to selfgovern after years of federal interference.90
The allotment and assimilation era also marks the period when Congress
began to significantly expand its criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country. The
United States’ policy concerning “the Indian country” criminal prosecutions began

85. Id.
86. 29 Cong. Rec. 2310 (1897) (statement of Sen. Bate). Although lacking in clarity, the 1897 Act
threatened an implied repeal of provisions protecting tribal courts in the 1890 law that established and
authorized a non-Indian territorial government for Oklahoma Territory, while leaving the Five Tribes in
a reduced Indian Territory with no territorial government. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81.
Sections 30 and 31 of the 1890 Act expressly preserved exclusive jurisdiction in the Five Tribes over all
cases involving tribal members as the sole parties. Id.; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381 (1896)
(finding that the Cherokee Nation had exclusive jurisdiction over an 1892 Cherokee murder in the
Cherokee Nation under its treaties and the 1890 Act).
87. Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (1898).
88. Id. The Choctaws and Chickasaws approved their agreement on August 24, 1898, before the
deadline established in the Curtis Act. See DEPT. INT., 56TH CONG., REP. OF THE COMM. TO THE FIVE CIV.
TRIBES 9 (1899) [hereinafter 1899 FCT REP.] Their agreement did not abolish tribal courts, instead
authorizing only a limited grant of federal court jurisdiction over certain land matters, homicide,
embezzlement, bribery, disturbance of the peace, and carrying weapons. See Act of June 28, 1898, ch.
517, § 29, 30 Stat. 495. See also Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1441–42 (D.C. Cir.
1988. However, a later appropriation act purportedly abolished Choctaw and Chickasaw Nation courts.
See Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1027. The Seminole Agreement contained a similar
limited grant of federal jurisdiction, but expressly protected Seminole courts. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch.
542, 30 Stat. 567. The final Cherokee agreement, unlike earlier versions, did not abolish Cherokee courts
and expressly preserved only two Curtis Act sections unrelated to tribal judicial functions. Act of July 1,
1902, ch. 1375, § 73, 32 Stat. 716. Compare Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 675, pmbl. and § 72, 31 Stat. 848
(agreement not effective because not ratified by Cherokees), with DEPT. INT., 57TH CONG., REP. OF THE
COMM. TO THE FIVE CIV. TRIBES 13, 37, 45, 1 app. § 80, and 1899 FCT REP. 49, 57, 2 app. § 71.
Notwithstanding these details, federal officials found it expedient in subsequent years to erroneously
proclaim that the Curtis Act abolished the tribal courts of all of the Five Tribes.
89. Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861.
90. See Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F.Supp. 1110 (D.C. Dist. 1976); Hodel, 670 F. Supp. 434 (D.C.
Dist.1987).
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with federal enactments as early as 1796.91 As of 1883, this federal policy was
embodied in the General Crimes Act (“GCA”).92 Under that law, federal courts
retained jurisdiction to try offenses enumerated and defined under the general laws
of the United States which were committed in “the Indian country” by Indians against
“white persons,” and by “white persons” against Indians. However, the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Crow Dog, interpreted the scope of the GCA narrowly; those
crimes committed by Indians against each other in “the Indian country” were left to
each tribe to resolve according to its local laws and customs.93 In direct response to
Crow Dog, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”).94 The MCA conferred
federal jurisdiction over certain enumerated major crimes by an Indian offender
against an Indian or non-Indian victim, including murder and rape, when committed
on an “Indian reservation” within a state or federal territory.95
In its 1866 treaty, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation agreed to federal legislation
as Congress deemed “necessary for the better administration of justice and the
protection of the rights of persons and property within the Indian Territory,” provided
that such federal legislation would not interfere with Creek organization, rights, laws,
privileges, and customs,96 which would have included the right to exercise
jurisdiction over the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s geographic area.
The federal government did not recognize full tribal law enforcement
authority over all U.S. citizens, and as a result, non-Indian offenders flooded into
Indian Territory.97 In response, Congress began implementing federal criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Territory in 1877 and the “Indian police,” under federal agency
supervision, assisted United States marshals and tribal police with law
enforcement.98 At this time, the United States was not seeking to exercise jurisdiction
over Indian-on-Indian crimes, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the other of the
Five Tribes were exercising full jurisdiction, including imposing the death penalty
for first-degree murder.99
When federal courts were eventually established in Indian Territory, federal
courts had authority to enforce general federal laws, such as the GCA and MCA,
consistent with the 1890 Act’s requirement that “all general laws of the United States
which prohibit crimes and misdemeanors in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall have the same force and effect in the Indian
Territory as elsewhere in the United States.”100 In cases where the laws of the United

91. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).
92. Rev. Stat. §§ 2145, 2146 (1878) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152). See also Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at
558.
93. Crow Dog, 109 U.S at 568, 571–72 (Indian-on-Indian murder on the Sioux reservation warranted
tribal jurisdiction, rather than federal jurisdiction, under Rev. Stat. § 2146).
94. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153). See also
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382–83 (1886); United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649, n.18
(1978).
95. § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385.
96. Treaty with the Creek Indians art. 10, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785.
97. COMM. OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 49TH CONG., ANN. REP. COMM’R INDIAN AFF. 91 (1886).
98. ANGIE DEBO, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHOCTAW REPUBLIC 185–89 (1934).
99. L. SUSAN WORK, THE SEMINOLE NATION OF OKLAHOMA: A LEGAL HISTORY 42 (2010)
100. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81, § 31.
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States and Arkansas laws concerned the same offense, “the laws of the United States
shall govern as to such offense.”101 “The [Five] tribes, however, retained exclusive
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal disputes involving only tribal members, and
the incorporated laws of Arkansas did not apply to such cases.”102
As the allotment processes continued, and it became clear to the Five Tribes
that statehood would eventually prevail, the tribes attempted one last effort to retain
some control by holding an inter-tribal constitutional convention in 1905 and
proposing their own state for congressional consideration: the State of Sequoyah.103
That effort failed and Oklahoma gained statehood in 1907, despite several treaty
guarantees to the Five Tribes that their territories would never be encompassed in a
future state.
Section 13 of the Oklahoma Enabling Act replaced the application of
Arkansas laws after statehood with “the laws in force in the Territory of Oklahoma,
as far as applicable . . . until changed by the legislature thereof.”104 The “laws in
force” in Oklahoma Territory at the time included federal laws, such as the GCA and
the MCA. Oklahoma courts were thus enabled, until such time as Oklahoma adopted
its own criminal laws, to apply Oklahoma Territory criminal laws to crimes subject
to state jurisdiction, such as crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians on Indian
country, and crimes by anyone outside Indian country.105 However, the Enabling Act
required the transfer to new federal courts prosecutions of “all crimes and offenses”
committed within Indian Territory, “which, had they been committed within a State,
would have been cognizable in the Federal courts,”106 including crimes under the
GCA and the MCA.107
The Oklahoma Enabling Act also preserved federal jurisdiction over
Indians and their lands, and required the state, as a condition of statehood, to disclaim
all rights and title to Indian lands.108 Oklahoma’s constitution contains the required
disclaimer, that acknowledges:
The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare that they
forever disclaim all right and title in or to . . . all lands lying within
said limits owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation; and that
until the title to any such public land shall have been extinguished
by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the
jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States.109

101. Id. at § 33.
102. See § 30 Stat. 693; Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n,
829 F.2d 967, 977–78 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988). See also § 31, 26 Stat. 81.
103. Stacy L. Leeds, Defeat or a Mixed Blessing–Tribal Sovereignty and the State of Sequoyah, 43
TULSA L. REV. 5 (2007)
104. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (emphasis added).
105. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
106. Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2911, § 1, 34 Stat. 1286.
107. See United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 469 (1926).
108. §§ 1, 3, 34 Stat. 267.
109. OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (amended 1907). As a result, DOI accordingly continued to fund the
Indian police in the former Indian Territory after statehood. See COMM. OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 62ND CONG.,
ANN. REP. COMM’R INDIAN AFF. 437 (1911). See also COMM. OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 61ST CONG., ANN.
REP. COMM’R INDIAN AFF. 106, 108–09 (1909).
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Despite these protections, the State of Oklahoma unilaterally and illegally
assumed criminal jurisdiction over all people throughout the entire state as soon as
it entered the Union.
In the darkest hour for the Five Tribes since forced removal, the allotment
agreements set dates certain when the governments of the Five Tribes would cease.
But shortly before Oklahoma statehood in 1907, Congress repealed those provisions
in individual allotment agreements with a sweeping Five Tribes Act that preserved
the legal existence of the Five Tribes by stating that their governments would
continue in full force and effect.110
It was common throughout the United States for allottees to hold lands in a
restricted status that continued to protect the land against alienation and state ad
valorum taxation for a period of twenty-five years. Muscogee (Creek) Nation
allottees, under the 1901 and 1902 allotment agreements, owned their allotments in
fee, subject to federal statutory restrictions against alienation (“restricted
allotments”) for only a five-year period, with a period up to twenty-one years for
forty-acre homesteads.111 The Five Tribes Act that continued the existence of the
tribal governments also strengthened land protections for the citizens of the Five
Tribes, extending restrictions on alienation to twenty-five years, but only if the
allottee was a full-blood Indian.112 These federal rules, tying land protections to
percentage of Indian blood, was unique to the Five Tribes and was not consistent
with tribal distinctions in their own communities. These federal rules, treating tribal
citizens differently based on percentage of Indian blood, continued until 2017.113
Congressional protections for the allotments of the Five Tribes’ members
were short-lived. By 1908, Congress removed restrictions against alienation for
Indians of less than one-half Indian blood, freedmen citizens, and intermarried white
citizens of the Five Tribes.114 Congress likewise delegated to Oklahoma courts
jurisdiction over the person and property of minor Five Tribes allottees. Oklahoma
courts were also given the authority to approve conveyances of restricted lands of
Indian heirs of deceased allottees, again, acting as federal instrumentalities and not
in the exercise of any inherent state power.115 Eventually, Congress removed the
Dawes Act’s protection entirely by authorizing the Secretary of Interior to issue fee
patents to “competent” allottees.116 In 1910, competency commissions started
visiting reservations nationwide. The result was the wholesale theft of many
allotments, with well-noted exploitation and fraudulent land transactions sanctioned

110. Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.
111. Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861; Act of June 30, 1902, ch. 1323, § 16, 32 Stat. 500.
112. § 19, 34 Stat. 137, 144.
113. See Stigler Act Amendments of 2018, H.R. 2606, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
114. Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 180; Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, §§ 1, 4, 35 Stat. 312.
115. §§ 2, 6, 9, 35 Stat. 312. See also Springer v. Townsend, 336 F.2d 397, 400 (10th Cir. 1964);
United States v. Gypsy Oil Co., 10 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1925). The United States still maintains a significant
role in state court proceedings involving restricted lands, including, the right to remove certain state
proceedings to federal court. See Act of Dec. 31, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-399, 132 Stat. 5333; Act of Aug.
4, 1947, ch. 458, §§ 1, 3,4 61 Stat. 731.
116. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349).
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by Oklahoma courts, all of which was intensified by the discovery of oil.117
Nationally, by 1912, over 200,000 acres of trust land was shifted to local tax rolls.118
Sales of trust allotments also increased, with 775,000 acres of inherited land being
sold between 1902 and 1910, which represented “only a fraction of the total territory
lost during those years.”119
C.

Phoenix Rising: The Modern Muscogee (Creek) Nation

As a result of whipsaw federal policies, as well as the steadfast refusal of
the executive branch to follow Congressional policy recognizing the existence of the
Five Tribes, there existed but a flickering “pilot light of tribal existence” within the
Creek Nation by the early twentieth century.120 Nonetheless, the Creek Nation
“refused to abandon their tribal government and political life.” By 1909 it held the
first of many annual “Creek Conventions.”121 Regularly scheduled Conventions
continued for decades, often without the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)
recognizing their legitimacy.122 Between 1934 and 1951, the Chief, who was elected
by the Creek people and then appointed by the Department of the Interior,
participated in the Convention, which functioned much as the Council and Chief had
earlier.123 The BIA briefly refused to recognize Creek government under a
constitution and bylaws approved by the Convention in 1944, but recognized in 1946
that the Convention had been acting as the official governing body of the Creeks
since 1924.124 In the early 1950s, the BIA again shifted direction, and dealt with a
Council appointed by the Chief, instead of the elected Convention.125
In the mid-1950s the BIA returned to the unlawful practice of treating
federally appointed Chiefs as the sole embodiment of Creek governmental
authority.126 Congress finally addressed the problem by recognizing the right of Five
Tribes citizens to elect their chiefs “by popular selection.”127 The BIA, in a
“determined use of its raw power,” nevertheless persisted in claiming that the Creek
Nation was a “government by Principal Chief alone.”128
As recognized by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the BIA’s
“bureaucratic imperialism”–– through its “deliberate attempts to frustrate, debilitate,
and generally prevent from functioning” the Creek tribal government––was contrary
to Congress’s express preservation of tribal governments in Section 28 of the Five

117. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBE 86–
87, 91, 117 (4th ed. 1991).
118. See generally FREDERICK E. HOXIE, THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS 1880-1920
(2001).
119. Id. at 160.
120. See Murphy, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 36.
121. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1133 (D.D.C. 1976).
122. Id. at 1133–38.
123. Id. at 1136.
124. Id. at 1137–38.
125. Id. at 1138–39.
126. Id. at 1139.
127. Act of Oct. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-495, 84 Stat. 1091 (1970).
128. Harjo, 420 F. Supp at1143.
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Tribes Act, including the right to elect chiefs and exercise legislative functions.129 In
1979, the Creeks reorganized under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act and adopted
a new constitution.130 During this same period, Congress ushered in the selfdetermination era of federal Indian policy by enacting the 1975 Indian SelfDetermination Act, the first of many federal laws promoting development of the
Creek Nation and other tribes.131 From then on, the flickering “pilot light of tribal
existence” came roaring back to life.
The Creek Nation’s capacity to enforce the law has changed significantly
since the end of the nineteenth century. Now, “The Nation’s Lighthorse Police
Department plays a pivotal role in coordinated law enforcement efforts on the
Reservation.”132 The Creek Nation currently has “cross-deputization agreements
with the United States, the State [of Oklahoma], and 32 county and municipal
jurisdictions.”133 The caseload is significant; it “responds to approximately 5,000
criminal and emergency situations throughout the Reservation annually,” often
serving as first responder, regardless of the race of the parties involved.134 State
officials have recognized the investigatory capabilities of the Lighthorse Police
Department, commenting that certain investigations “would not have been possible
without the close cooperation and outstanding effort of all of the agencies involved
[including the] Creek Nation Lighthorse.”135
Like the Nation’s law enforcement, “the Nation has a robust criminal
jurisdiction, has robust courts, [and] is already prosecuting many Indians. The Nation
also supplies a special U.S. attorney to the United States to prosecute major
crimes . . . pursuant to congressional authorization.”136 The Creek Nation has gone
to considerable lengths to protect the constitutional rights of the accused.137 The
Court’s prosecutions are conducted consistent with the Indian Civil Rights Act, the
Tribal Law and Order Act, and the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2013.138 As a result, the Nation “affords defendants protections mirroring those of
the federal Bill of Rights, including due process and equal protection, assistance of

129. Id. at 1118, 1141-43.
130. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5210). See also Indian
Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967, 970–71 (10th Cir.
1987). The OIWA was enacted two years after the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), which officially
ended the allotment era for all tribes. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, Pub. L. No. 96-363, 48 Stat. 985.
Section 13 of the IRA provided that five IRA sections were inapplicable to Oklahoma tribes. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 5118 (1990) (listing sections codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5107, 5110, 5123, 5124, and 5125, concerning
some matters later addressed in the OIWA). All other IRA provisions applied in Oklahoma.
131. Act of January 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 96-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301, et seq.).
132. Brief of Amici Curiae Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Support of Respondent at 28–31, Carpenter
v. Murphy, 591 U.S. __ (2020) (No. 1107), [hereinafter Murphy, Brief for Muscogee (Creek) Nation].
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 27–28.
136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 65–66, Carpenter v. Murphy, 591 U.S. __ (2020) (No. 1107),
[hereinafter Murphy, Transcript of Oral Argument].
137. See Murphy, Brief for Muscogee (Creek) Nation, supra note 132, at 28.
138. Id. at 28.
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counsel, and in the case of non-Indian defendants, the right to a jury pool including
non-Indian community members.”139
In addition to law enforcement, tribal governments throughout Oklahoma
are providing important governmental functions, including “healthcare,
infrastructure, education”—often in order to fill a gap left by the State of
Oklahoma.140 For example, the Nation’s healthcare system “serves more than 30,000
Indian and non-Indian patients each quarter [or a total of approximately 120,000
patients per year] at its two rural hospitals, rehabilitation center, and six medical
clinics.”141 One of its hospitals “was on the verge of closing before the Nation
purchased and rehabilitated it.”142 Today, the Creek Nation provides “emergency
room, laboratory, surgical, and inpatient and outpatient specialty care.”143
In the realm of education, the Creek Nation has contributed over $40 million
to the State’s public education fund in the years between 2013 and 2017.144 It
likewise provides a Head Start program for 286 children and it supports women,
infants, and children through its special supplemental nutrition program.145 It does
all of this “without regard to tribal citizenship.”146 It also works to prevent violence
in the home with its Family Violence Prevention Program.147 Since 2016, that
program has served 475 Indian and 306 non-Indian clients, providing “24-hour
emergency assistance and crisis intervention [as well as] providing treatment and
evidence collection, legal advocacy and multi-jurisdictional program
coordination.”148 Importantly, the Creek Nation often provides these in the place of
the responsible state governmental agency. For example, Okmulgee County, “being
rural in nature, is lacking in resources . . . to ensure safety, justice, support and
healing for adults impacted by sexual or domestic violence. Fortunately, [the
County] is able to consistently direct people to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
program for their invaluable services.”149
Today, tribal Nations and the State of Oklahoma have “654 tribal compacts
[that] govern cooperation on taxes, fire services, environmental protection, and
more.”150 As a result of these efforts:
[I]f you were in a car accident [on] fee land within the historic
boundaries [of the Creek Reservation], . . . you might be driving
on roads owned and paved by the tribe, the first responder might

139. Id.
140. Murphy, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 136, at 73. See also Murphy, Brief for
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, supra note 132, at 28–31.
141. Murphy, Brief for Muscogee (Creek) Nation, supra note 132, at 29 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 30.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 28.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 29.
150. Murphy, Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 57.
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be a tribal police officer, and you might be taken to a community
hospital built and run by the tribe.151
Although unique in its particulars, the history of the Creek Nation is a story
all too familiar in Indian Country; a story that has been intimately intertwined with
federal law and policy since the formation of the United States. Although Congress
and the executive branches of the United States have espoused a policy of selfdetermination for over fifty years, the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court has largely taken a hiatus from its foundational jurisprudence during that same
time, instead invoking a new brand of subjectivist jurisprudence in Federal Indian
law.
III.
THE COMPETING JURISPRUDENTIAL POLICIES OF THE
SUPREME COURT: THE FOUNDATION PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT’S SUBJECTIVIST
APPROACH
Early Federal Indian law is part of the bedrock of American
jurisprudence.152 Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall’s trilogy of cases from the
early nineteenth-century not only provided the legal justification for American
expansion west but also defined much of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding
federalism before the Civil War.153 As a result, Federal Indian law makes up an
inextricable part of the American rule of law.154 Unfortunately—as a direct result of
whipsaw federal law and policies—the practice of Indian law long required
“wander[ing] the maze of Indian statutes and case law tracing back [over] 100
years.”155 The confusion continued until Justice Thurgood Marshall took up the
mantle, working to distill the field back into a coherent body.156 That effort centered
on the “foundation principles” that the Court has invariably returned to over the
centuries, asserting that:
(1) [A]n Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the inherent
powers of any sovereign state; (2) a tribe’s presence within the
territorial boundaries of the United States subjects the tribe to
federal legislative power and precludes the exercise of external
powers of sovereignty of the tribe . . . but does not by itself affect
the internal sovereignty of the tribe; and (3) inherent tribal powers
are subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation of
Congress, but except as thus expressly qualified, full powers of
internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly
constituted organs of government.157

151. Murphy, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 36.
152. See Blackhawk, supra note 19, at 1795, 1804.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 7.
156. Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Getches, supra note 22, at 1653.
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Rooted in these foundation principles are the Indian canons of construction:
The basic Indian law canons of construction require that treaties,
agreements, statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed
in favor of the Indians and that all ambiguities are to be resolved
in their favor. In addition, treaties and agreements are to be
construed as the Indians would have understood them, and tribal
property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s
intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.158
Although these principles are as old as the Republic, their application
reached its zenith in the so-called “modern era” of Federal Indian law. The late Dean
David Getches described the modern era, which spanned from 1959 through the
1980s, as a time that “encouraged a reinvigoration of tribal governments throughout
the country. During this period, tribes gained political influence and economic
security as Congress and the executive generally promoted a policy of tribal selfdetermination.”159
This was also a time of unprecedented support for tribal sovereignty from
the Supreme Court.160 Overall, between 1959 and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s
retirement in 1991, the Supreme Court heard approximately eighty cases involving
Indian law, and tribes were successful approximately 48% of the time.161 More
important were the impact of individual cases to tribal sovereignty. The Court
reaffirmed the special government-to-government relationship between tribes and
the United States.162 It recognized that tribes have the sovereign right to assess

158. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, at § 4.02.
159. Id. at § 2.02.
160. Getches, supra note 22, at 1574.
161. See generally Lawrence R. Baca, 40 Years of U.S. Supreme Court Indian Law Cases: The Justices
and How they Voted, THE FED. LAWYER, April 2015, at 18.
162. Lawrence R. Baca calculated that sixty-eight cases were heard between 1976 and 1991, twentynine of which were favorable to Indian interests. Id. at 19. Additionally, between Williams v. Lee and 1976
the Court heard another twelve cases. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975) (invalidating
Washington state laws seeking to regulate off-reservation treaty hunting); United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544 (1975) (upholding a federal law that regulated the distribution of alcohol on non-Indian fee land
within Indian reservations and could validly delegate regulatory authority to tribes over the same); Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding a hiring preference for members of federally recognized
Indian tribes at the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the basis that the preference was based on a political rather
than racial classification); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (holding that Congress did not intend to
exclude full-blooded, unassimilated Indians living in an Indian community near their native reservation,
who maintained close economic and social ties with that reservation from receiving federal general
assistance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973)
(holding that a Washington state regulation that prohibited net fishing but allowed hook and line fishing
was discriminatory against tribal members); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973) (invalidating an Arizona income tax as applied to tribal members that derived their income entirely
from reservation sources); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding that the State
of Arizona could not tax tribal lands within the reservation but could tax certain off-reservation business
activities); United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159 (1971) (reversing a
decision by the Indian Claims Commission finding the United States liable for compensation and
accounting by the United States); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (regarding
hunting rights were not implicitly abrogated by the Menominee Termination Act); Puyallup Tribe v.
Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (invalidating state regulation of tribal treaty fishing except
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taxes,163 and for reservation Indians and on-reservation tribal goods and services to
be free from state taxation.164 The Court also decided a number of landmark treaty
rights cases in favor of tribes throughout the United States,165 and significantly
limited state civil and criminal jurisdiction within Indian Country.166
A.

The Rise of Subjectivism

The modern era came to an end with the ascension of William Rehnquist as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Rehnquist Court’s treatment of Federal
Indian law has been well documented.167 The Court backed away from foundation
principles, indicating—as put by the late Justice Antonin Scalia—a belief that:
[O]pinions in [Federal Indian law] have not posited an original
state of affairs that can subsequently be altered only by explicit
legislation, but have rather sought to discern what the current state
of affairs ought to be by taking into account all legislation, and the
congressional “expectations” that it reflects, to the present day.168
Analysis by Lawrence Baca shows that “[d]uring Rehnquist’s tenure
(1987–2005) . . . 52 Indian law cases were decided with 15 favorable to Indian
interests and 37 against. Indian interests were now failing [7]1 percent of the
time.”169
Tribes fared no better under the Roberts Court. Between Chief Justice
Roberts’ appointment to the Court and Justice Antonin Scalia’s sudden death in
2016, the Court decided a total of thirteen cases involving Native interests.170
regulation necessary for species conservation and that does not discriminate against tribal fishing); Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (holding invalid a state gross proceeds
tax on a federally-licensed Indian trader for sales occurring on the Navajo Reservation); Seymour v.
Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (holding that the state was without
jurisdiction to try a member of the Confederated Colville Tribes for a crime that occurred within the
Reservation but on land owned by a non-Indian). Although it is often difficult to identify winners and
losers in these complex cases, we estimate that during this time period, nine cases favored tribal interests,
one did not, and two were a draw. Resultantly, between Williams v. Lee and Justice Marshall’s retirement
in 1991, the Supreme Court heard eighty cases involving Indian tribes and Indian interests were successful
in approximately thirty-eight of those cases.
163. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535.
164. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
165. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164;
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. 145.
166. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979); Antoine, 420 U.S. 194; Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404. But see Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Department of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 429 U.S.
976 (1976); Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. 392.
167. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). However, at the same time the Court significantly curtailed tribal criminal
and civil regulatory authority over non-Indians. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
168. See generally Getches, supra note 22, at 1573; Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 1; Baca,
supra note 161, at 18.
169. Getches, supra note 22, at 1575.
170. Baca, supra note 161, at 19.
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According to Lawrence Baca, an astounding 77% of those cases were decided against
the tribes.171
The Indian law jurisprudence of the Rehnquist-Roberts Courts has been
marked by three “new rules of judicial subjectivism.”172 First, the Court has
“[r]etreat[ed] from the established canons of construction,” by simply “dismiss[ing]
the canons by declaring that no true ambiguity exists.”173 Second, despite its
wholesale repudiation by Congress, the Court has applied “[n]ineteenth-century
allotment policy as the touchstone for Congressional intent.”174 Finally, the Court
has abandoned “[t]he established role of Indian law preemption analysis,” in favor
of the “[f]abrication of a ‘balancing of interests’ test,” whereby “it . . . gauges tribal
sovereignty as a function of changing conditions—demographic, social, political,
and economic—and the expectations they create in the minds of affected nonIndians.”175
After thirty years, the Court has largely directed Indian law practitioners—
particularly those aligned against tribal interests—away from arguments based on
foundation principles and toward its subjectivist approach.176 This has created a selffulfilling prophecy, reducing the instances when the Court is hearing foundationbased arguments, thereby increasing the probability of a subjectivist outcome. The
underpinning of the subjectivist approach is the fabricated “balancing of interests”
test, whereby the court “collect[s] ingredients for ad hoc judicial balancing” of tribal
rights and balances them against the “demographic, social, political, and
economic . . . expectations . . . in the minds of affected non-Indians.”177
Although the strategy is often case-specific, invariably the tactic involves
fear-based arguments that a decision in favor of the tribes will alter the settled
balance of power between tribes, states, and non-Indians. Oklahoma took this
approach to new heights during oral argument in Murphy, arguing that:
There are 2,000 prisoners in state court who committed a crime in
the former Indian territory who self-identify as Native
American . . . . That’s 155 murderers, 113 rapists, and over 200

171. See id. at 29–30.
172. Id.
173. See generally Getches, supra note 22, at 1620–30.
174. Id. at 1620–22. See also Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 18 (noting that under Rehnquist
the Court often “interpreted what seems an ambiguous statute against Indian interests”).
175. Getches, supra note 22, at 1622–26.
176. Id. at 1575, 1626–30. See also Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 1 (“As Chief Justice,
[Rehnquist] . . . has upheld Indian self-government only to the extent that non-Indians are not affected.”).
177. Although beyond the scope of this work, we stress that this subjectivist approach has infiltrated
tribal advocacy as well. For example, Creek Nation advocate Riyaz Kanji repeatedly stressed the benefits
tribal governance brings to non-Indians, arguing the Creek nation provides important governmental
functions, including “healthcare, infrastructure, education”—often in order to fill a gap left by Oklahoma.
Murphy, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 136, at 73. See also Murphy, Brief for Muscogee
(Creek) Nation, supra note 132, at 28. Advocates for Jimcy McGirt dedicated an entire section in its
petitioner’s brief entitled “The Sky is Not Falling.” Brief for Petitioner at 39, McGirt v. Oklahoma (U.S.
Feb. 4, 2020) (No. 18-9526). Although the majority of tribal arguments continue to focus on foundation
principles, the space dedicated toward refuting these subjectivist arguments represents lost opportunities
to dedicate more effort toward recentering the precedent of the Supreme Court.
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felons who committed crimes against children [and could be
released if the Court sides with Murphy].178
However, the strategy is often more subtle. Sometimes the argument is
based on economics—the recognition of a treaty right would plunge a non-Indian
community into economic chaos. Although from a different era, non-Indian
arguments in the groundbreaking reserved water rights case Winters v. United States
amply demonstrates the approach.179 There, non-Indian water users went to great
lengths to highlight the following:
[I]n establishing a civilized community in said country and in
building and maintaining churches, schools, villages, and other
elements and accompaniments of civilization; that said
communities consist of thousands of people, and, if the claim of the
United States and the Indians be maintained, the lands of the
defendants and the other settlers will be rendered valueless, the
said communities will be broken up, and the purpose and object of
the government in opening said lands for settlement will be wholly
defeated.180
As a result, according to the non-Indian water users, a decision in favor of
the tribes would cause “‘their lands [to] be ruined, it will be necessary to abandon
their homes, and they will be greatly and irreparably damaged, the extent and amount
of which damage cannot now be estimated.’”181
This argument consistently shows up in cases related to natural resources
as well. For example, in United States v. Washington the United States and tribes of
Western Washington sued the State of Washington to force it to replace salmon
migration blocking culverts throughout the western portion of the state.182 The State,
in an attempt to sway the economic balance in its favor, “implied the cost of
complying with the court’s order will oblige the State to cut other important state
programs,” arguing:
[T]he injunction will require the State to devote roughly $100
million per year more than it otherwise would have to culvert repair.
This at a time when the State faces recurring budget shortfalls in the
billions of dollars and has already made deep and painful cuts to
subsidized health insurance for low-income workers, K-12
schools, higher education, and basic aid for persons unable to
work.183
State parties often argue that tribes will take unfair advantage of their treaty
rights or use them in a way that will harm the broader community. Most recently,
178. Getches, supra note 22, at 1575, 1626–30. See also Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 1 (“As
Chief Justice, [Rehnquist] . . . has upheld Indian self-government only to the extent that non-Indians are
not affected.”).
179. Murphy, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 136, at 76–77.
180. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
181. Id. at 570.
182. Id.
183. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2018).
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this played out in Washington Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den where the State of
Washington argued that the Yakama Nation’s treaty right to “travel on all public
highways,” did not include the right to transport fuel from Oregon to its reservation
free from state taxation.184 Part of their argument was that if the Nation had such a
right:
[I]t places a cloud over the state’s ability to regulate Yakama use
of highways in other ways as well. Rules like licensing
requirements, truck weight limits or other safety rules, and even
speed limits arguably would be preempted . . . If carrying goods
over the highways immunizes the Yakama from any state
oversight, they would be free to ignore such regulations.185
At oral argument, counsel for the State went even further, arguing that a
right to travel free from state regulation would allow “a Yakama member [to] possess
illegal firearms or illegal drugs or diseased apples in their car . . . and bring them into
the state and [allow tribal members to] say your laws against these things violate my
right to travel by public highway.”186
Washington State likewise argued that the Yakama Nation would take
advantage of its rights to take “an unfair advantage over both non-Indian businesses
and businesses owned by members of the twenty-eight other tribes in Washington
and other tribes nationwide. The Yakama should not be allowed to use an untenable
treaty interpretation to market a tax exemption throughout the country.”187
Washington’s argument is derived from a long line of subjectivist cases that
preclude tribes from “marketing an exemption” from state taxation to non-Indians
because “the Tribes could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores
at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep discounts and drawing
custom from surrounding areas.”188 And these arguments have seen success. In the
arena of state taxation of non-Indians on the reservation, the Court has abandoned
foundation principles “whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal selfgovernment, or otherwise,” and instead measures the validity of the exemption
against its perception of whether it would give the tribes an “unfair” advantage over
non-Indians.189
Similarly, non-Indian litigants attack tribal sovereign immunity as
providing an unfair advantage to tribal nations to the detriment of their non-Indian
neighbors. Although the Court in this arena has largely remained true to its
foundation principle that Congress has plenary authority to limit tribal sovereignty,
it has done so with extreme reluctance, noting that “immunity can harm those who
are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity,

184. Id. at 978.
185. Washington St. Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 1000 (2018).
186. Brief for Petitioner at 44, Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den (U.S. Aug. 9, 2018)
(No. 16-1498), [hereinafter Cougar Den, Brief for Petitioner].
187. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, (U.S.
Oct. 30, 2018) (No. 16-1498).
188. Cougar Den, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 186, at 44.
189. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980).
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or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims.”190 Taking their
cue from the Court, non-Indian litigants have focused their arguments on the negative
effects of tribal sovereign immunity on non-Indian communities in an effort to
convince the Court that it is necessary to “‘level[ ] the playing field’” for the benefit
of non-Indians.191
As a result of these efforts, support for tribal sovereign immunity is hanging
by a thread within the Supreme Court. In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,
the last major sovereign immunity case at the Supreme Court, at least four justices
voiced their concern that “the conflict and inequities brought on by blanket tribal
immunity have also increased. Tribal immunity significantly limits, and often
extinguishes, the States’ ability to protect their citizens and enforce the law against
tribal businesses.”192 Although he joined with the majority in Upper Skagit Tribe v.
Lundgren in remanding the case to the lower court to address the scope of tribal
sovereign immunity in in rem proceedings, Chief Justice Roberts wrote separately to
ask:
What precisely is someone in the [non-Indian person’s] position
supposed to do? There should be a means of resolving a mundane
dispute . . . even when one of the parties to the dispute . . . is an
Indian tribe. The correct answer cannot be that the tribe always
wins no matter what; otherwise a tribe could wield sovereign
immunity as a sword and seize property with impunity, even
without a colorable claim of right.193
States have long argued that tribes cannot be trusted to manage their own
hunting and fishing rights—they will harvest to extinction unless states are able to
control them. This argument occurred recently in Herrera v. Wyoming, a case
involving whether the Crow Tribe’s treaty right to hunt on all “unoccupied lands of
the United States” included national forest lands within the State of Wyoming. As
part of their argument against that right, the State of Wyoming argued:
[The Court should not] remake history and grant the Indians . . . a
treaty right to a state resource . . . now to be harvested with jeeps,
trucks, four wheelers and snowmobiles instead of on foot or
horseback; and this time using semiautomatic weapons, scopes,
lasers, rangefinders, rather than bow and arrow, the spear, and
black powder firearms.194
Wyoming openly argued that only the state could be trusted to manage elk
within the state and that the absence of that regulatory authority “would surely lead

190. Id.
191. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998).
192. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014) (quoting Brief for Petitioner
at 38, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community (U.S. Aug. 30, 2013) (No. 12-515)).
193. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 823 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. Second Supplemental Response to Motion to Dismiss at 13, Wyoming v. Herrera, CT 2014-2687,
2688 (Wyo. Cir. Oct. 8, 2015).
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to [the] ‘progressive depletion,’” of the elk population within the region.195 It argued
that without state regulation tribal members would take “the easy kills, in the dead
of the winter, on the Wyoming side of the state line, regardless of the
consequences.”196 The argument was successful, at least at the state circuit court
level, which concluded that “[w]ithout regulation . . . a [tribal] hunter or hunters
[could] decimat[e] a herd of elk within a few minutes.”197
This argument has been made repeatedly in the arena of fishing rights,
starting with Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of the State of Washington.198 There,
Washington State argued for a regulatory scheme that allowed it to prevent the
Puyallup Tribe from “tak[ing] all but the last fish.”199 The State took for granted that
the tribe was incapable of regulating itself; the tribal right, without state control
“would effectively destroy the economic and recreational value of the resource . . .
it leaves an Indian commercial fishery . . . subject to no meaningful management or
control.”200
Most troubling, anti-tribal advocates often use Indian children as a sword
in their effort to tip the scales in their favor, arguing that tribes will invade the
sanctity of non-Indian homes and rob them of their authority to parent their children.
For example, Lisa Blatt—the same lawyer that represented Oklahoma in Murphy—
argued in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl that affirming the Indian Child Welfare Act
would:
[A]pply to the next case and to a[n] apartment in New York City
where a tribal member impregnates someone who’s AfricanAmerican or Jewish or Asian Indian, and in that view, even though
the father is a completely absentee father, you are rendering these
women second-class citizens with inferior rights to direct their
reproductive rights [regarding] who raises their child.
You are relegating adoptive parents to go to the back of the bus
and wait in line if they can adopt. And you’re basically relegating
the child, the child to a piece of property with a sign that says,
“Indian, keep off. Do not disturb.”201
She reprised this tactic in Murphy, arguing that “[u]nder the Indian Child
Welfare Act . . . [a]ffirmance raises the specter of tearing [apart] families all across

195. Supplemental Response to Motion to Dismiss at 16, Wyoming v. Herrera, CT 2014-2687 2688
(Wyo. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).
196. Id.
197. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Striking Evidentiary Hearing and Granting the State’s Motion
in Limine at 6, Wyoming v. Herrera, CT 2014-2687, 2688, (Wyo. Cir. Oct. 16, 2015). The Supreme Court
did not pass judgment on this argument, noting that “[t]he appellate court did not reach this issue.” Herrera
v. Wyoming, 139 S.Ct. 1686, 1703 (2019). However, the Court left the door open for the State to remake
its arguments, concluding that “[O]n remand, the state may press its arguments as to why the application
of state conservation regulations . . . is necessary.” Id.
198. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
199. Brief for Respondent at 20, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of the State of Washington (U.S.
March 3, 1968) (No. 247).
200. Id.
201. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62–63, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (U.S. April 16, 2013) (No.
12-399).
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eastern Oklahoma, and probably beyond, for years and years and years and years
after the fact.”202
Subjectivist arguments reach their zenith where a decision could alter the
jurisdictional landscape. Oklahoma’s arguments in Murphy are a prime example of
this, beginning and ending its arguments with a discussion of the “settled
expectations across half of Oklahoma,”203 hyperbolizing that a decision in favor of
the Creek Nation would “reincarnate Indian Territory in the form of ‘Indian country’
under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), cleaving the State in half. . . . That revolutionary result
would shock the 1.8 million residents of eastern Oklahoma [and] would plunge
eastern Oklahoma into civil, criminal, and regulatory turmoil.”204
In a not so subtle comparison to what the Court could expect if the Creek
Reservation is preserved, Oklahoma harkens back to conditions in Indian Territory
before Congress temporarily abolished tribal governance of the region: “Rampant
disorder and lawlessness reigned . . . . Violent crime went largely unpunished and
business agreements were effectively unenforceable.”205 Where jurisdiction is at
play, the true concern about the “settled expectations” of non-Indians becomes about
control; whether tribal governments could or should be able to have a say in the
conduct of non-Indians within the reservation. Amici from non-Indian agricultural
and oil and gas interests in Murphy lay this bare, arguing the Tenth Circuit’s decision
“threatens to substantially enlarge tribal civil [and regulatory] jurisdiction over
nonmembers in Eastern Oklahoma;” “threatens Oklahoma citizens and businesses
with tribal taxation;” “threatens Oklahoma citizens and businesses with dispute
resolution in tribal courts;” and that “[f]ederal authority delegated to tribes may oust
state regulation.”206
The argument presumes that tribes are unfit to govern non-Indians,
imputing incompetence and bias upon tribal governments, particularly tribal courts.
A textbook example of this treatment comes from Dollar General v. Mississippi
Choctaw, the last Supreme Court case to address the scope of tribal court civil
jurisdiction.207 There, Dollar General spent considerable time attempting to convince
the Court that “Nonmembers’ status as outsiders . . . can give rise to a substantial
risk of unfair treatment [in tribal courts].”208 Dollar General summed up the “features
of tribal courts that risk unfair treatment of outsiders” to include “the lack of judicial
training and independence, the risk of local bias and the limited protections against
it, etc.”209 Earlier, it had explained:

202. Murphy, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 136, at 76–77.
203. Murphy, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 56.
204. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
205. Id.
206. Brief of Amici Curiae Environmental Federation of Oklahoma, Inc., Oklahoma Cattlemen’s
Association, Oklahoma Farm Bureau Legal Foundation, Mayes County Farm Bureau, Muskogee County
Garm Bureau, Oklahoma Oil & Gas Association, and State Chamber of Oklahoma in Support of
Petitioner, at i, Carpenter v. Murphy (U.S. July 30, 2018) (No. 17-1107).
207. Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S.Ct. 2159 (2016).
208. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (U.S. Aug.
31, 2015) (No. 13-1496).
209. Id. at 54.

Summer 2021

FAMILIAR CROSSROADS

329

[T]ribal courts can vary considerably from the norms that govern
the judicial systems contemplated by the Constitution. In both civil
and criminal cases, tribal courts “are influenced by the unique
customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they serve.” The Bill
of Rights applies to neither criminal nor civil trials in tribal court.
The potential “subordinat[ion] to the political branches of tribal
governments” that characterizes some tribal courts is also a feature
that applies to both civil and criminal cases.210
Indeed, Dollar General dedicated so much of its argument to casting
uncertainty and mistrust upon tribal courts that Justice Kagan summed its argument
as follows:
All of these arguments, your arguments––let me figure out whether
this is right. Your arguments about [tribal courts]––it’s a
nonneutral forum, it’s an unfair forum, we don’t know whether
they have the same procedures that––that are commonly––that
commonly exist in Federal and State courts.211
Advocates have likewise harnessed the Court’s tendency to use
“[n]ineteenth-century allotment policy as the touchstone for Congressional
intent.”212 The State of Oklahoma’s arguments in Murphy once again demonstrate
the approach. There, the State entirely ignores federal policy from the reorganization
and self-determination eras, focusing instead on the argument centered on allotment
era Congressional acts: “[A]ll understood that Congress—through a series of
statutes—was abrogating the treaties, destroying tribal sovereignty, ending Indian
interests in the land, and creating a new State through undifferentiated union with
Oklahoma Territory.”213 Through these acts, Oklahoma concludes, “Congress
expressly repudiated every promise that could have made the area a reservation.”214
At oral argument, Lisa Blatt, the lawyer for Oklahoma, laid out those portions of the
statutory record that supported the State’s position:
Now just remember, in Sections 26 and 28 of the Curtis Act, all
tribal courts are abolished. All tribal taxes are abolished in Section
16 of the Five Tribes Act. A tribal law is unenforceable. In Section
15, tribal—all tribal buildings and furniture, the tribal schools,
property, money, books, papers, and records were all ordered to be
turned over or face imprisonment of five years in jail . . . . I mean,
I could keep going on.215
And she did keep going on:

210. Id. at 39 (internal citations omitted).
211. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2015) (No. 13-1496).
212. Getches, supra note 22, at 1622–26.
213. Murphy, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 51 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 21. See also id. at 10, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27, 29, 38, 47, 49.
215. Murphy, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 136, at 11–12.
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[E]very piece of paper, record, book, dollar bill or coin or property,
their buildings, their furniture, their desks, everything was taken
away from the tribes . . . Their taxes were abolished. Their tribal
law was unenforceable. Every single federal court, tribal chief,
tribal lawyer, members of Congress, Oklahoma historians, and the
popular press recognized that the only authority [the Nation] had
was to equalize allotments with the money and sign deeds.216
To Oklahoma, broken promises beget broken promises; the fact that
“[w]ithin a decade [of the Creek Allotment Act], ‘the bulk of the landed wealth of
the Indians passed into individual hands,’” is potent evidence of disestablishment.217
Or that these lands were taken from tribal members in “‘an orgy of plunder and
exploitation unparalleled in American history,’ as Creek citizens were swindled out
of allotments . . . There was ‘legalized robbery’ through courts, and entire land
companies formed for the ‘systematic and wholesale exploitation of the Indian
through evasion or defiance of the law.’”218
And so, the logic goes: since Congress had broken other promises it had
made to the Creek Nation, it necessarily follows that it also intended to break the
promises made in the Treaties of 1832 and 1833. The promises made in those treaties
need not be strictly construed; close enough is good enough:
[T]his Court has never required a complete extinction of tribal
government to find reservation disestablishment . . . Congress
need not extinguish the pilot light of tribal existence to disestablish
reservation borders.219
But, of course, that’s exactly what a decision grounded in foundation
principles and the canons of construction require: a “clear textual signal” that
“unequivocally reveal[s] a widely held, contemporaneous understanding” that
Congress actually intended to disestablish the Creek Reservation.220 Indeed, that
flickering “pilot light of tribal existence,” came roaring back to life with passage of
the 1936 Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, which provided the Creek Nation with the
“right to organize for its common welfare and adopt a constitution and bylaws.”221
This is the hallmark of the subjectivist approach. Ignore the innumerable
laws and policies developed by Congress that support tribal rights and sovereignty
and instead laser in on its short-lived but destructive policies from the Allotment Era
by “filling gaps in legislation and construing tribal sovereign powers in accordance
with allotment-era goals merely because some or all of a reservation has been

216. Id. at 19–20.
217. Murphy, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 12.
218. Murphy, Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 14.
219. Murphy, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 36.
220. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984). See also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740
(1986) (“[There must be] clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its
intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty.”).
221. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (1936).
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allotted.”222 In so doing, the necessary inference is that the allotment policies were
correct and Congress’ policy of self-determination is wrong.
Accordingly, Oklahoma invites the Court to usurp Congress’ power over
Indian affairs and chart its own path—not according to what the law is, but instead
according to what it believes the law should be. The goal, in other words, is to
perpetuate the Allotment Era as the preferred approach.
B.

A Return to Form [Foundation Principles?]

Despite the increasing prevalence of subjectivist arguments and decisions,
“the Court often recites and sometimes acts upon foundation
principles . . . [p]articularly when non-Indian interests are not seriously
threatened.”223 As a result, despite the Court’s relatively short departure from
bedrock principles of Federal Indian law “[i]t is not too late in the day to revisit two
centuries of consistently and firmly reiterated precedent or to expect a basic
reformation of the historical legal relationship of the United States to Indian
tribes.”224 However, to do so, “[o]ne or more of the new Justices—or future
appointees—[must] steer doctrine back on track using foundation principles by
taking responsibility as Justice Thurgood Marshall did, for writing a large number of
opinions based on consistent principles.”225 For almost thirty years, Indian Country
has been waiting for this intellectual leader to join the Court.
That leader finally arrived in 2009 with the appointment of Sonia
Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court. Of Puerto Rican descent and born
and raised in a housing project in the Bronx borough of New York City, Justice
Sotomayor is unique on the Court in her ability to empathize with economically
disadvantaged minority communities throughout the United States.226 That empathy
has resulted in a voting record that is almost perfectly aligned with tribal interests.227
Unfortunately, the appointment of Justice Sotomayor could not alone alter
the Court’s misguided approach to Federal Indian law. Although she brought the
intellectual leadership necessary to “steer doctrine back on track,” the subjectivist
wing of the Court still held a slight edge in votes. As a result, Justice Sotomayor

222. Getches, supra note 22, at 1626.
223. Id. at 1576, 1617.
224. Id. at 1581.
225. Id. at 1631.
226. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 14 (2013).
227. See Baca, supra note 161, at 30. Since 2015, Justice Sotomayor has also joined the majority in
Upper Skagit Tribe v. Lundgren (remanding the case to adjudicate the question of whether tribes have
sovereign immunity in in rem lawsuits because the legal theory advanced by the respondents
underpinnings of federal Indian law that has led her to become the intellectual leader that Indian Country
has so sorely needed. was not raised until late in the case); the plurality in Washington State Dept. of
Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., (holding that the Yakama Nation’s treaty right to travel pre-empted the
State of Washington’s fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den’s importation of fuel to the reservation); and
wrote the majority opinion in Herrera v. Wyoming (the Crow Tribe’s off-reservation hunting rights were
not implicitly abrogated by the State of Wyoming’s admission into the Union). Although the decisions
were per curium, she also participated in 4-4 affirmances—both of which were favorable to tribal
interests—in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and Washington v. United
States.
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often found herself dissenting in Indian law cases for her first years on the bench.228
That has seemingly changed since Neil Gorsuch has replaced Antonin Scalia as a
Justice on the Supreme Court. The Court has heard four Indian law cases since
Justice Gorsuch’s appointment.229 Although one case—Washington v. United
States—ended in a 4-4 affirmance without an opinion and another—Upper Skagit
Tribes v. Lundgren—turned on issues not directly related to fundamental Federal
Indian law,230 all four decisions have been favorable to tribal interests. More
importantly, the remaining cases— Washington State Department of Licensing v.
Cougar Den, Inc. and Herrera v. Wyoming—are both based on foundation principles
of Federal Indian law.231 The question is whether the Court’s recent decisions
represent an aberration from its subjectivist approach, or whether it has finally
returned to its foundation principles.
With a sample pool of just four cases—only two of which were based upon
the merits of Federal Indian law—it was impossible to know whether the
appointment of justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch mark a turning point for Supreme
Court Indian jurisprudence. Indeed, Dean Getches and the late Professor Ralph
Johnson both have commented that the Court’s true weakness is that it “became
susceptible to arguments that the impacts on non-Indians were too severe.”232
Although both Cougar Den and Herrera are hugely important to the parties involved,
neither severely affect non-Indian interests. Murphy, on the other hand, was alleged
to affect upwards of 1.8 million non-Indian people.233 Unlike Cougar Den and
Herrera, therefore, the facts in Murphy forced the Court to confront its competing
philosophies—foundation versus subjectivist principles—that have been jockeying
for supremacy for the past half-century.
IV.

THE LAW OF DISESTABLISHMENT

At its core, McGirt is a reservation disestablishment case. If the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation was lawfully established and no further treaty or act of Congress

228. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band
of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564
U.S. 162 (2011).
229. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S.Ct. 1649 (2018); Washington v. United States, 138
S.Ct 1832 (2018); Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637; Pottawatomi Indians, 567 U.S. 209; Jicarilla, 564 U.S. 162.
230. At issue in Upper Skagit Tribes was whether a tribe enjoys sovereign immunity in in rem cases.
See Upper Skagit Tribe, 138 S.Ct. at 1655. The non-Indian respondents initially claimed that the Supreme
Court had authorized such suits in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation.
Id. However, half-way through the briefing before the United States Supreme Court, the respondents
changed course and abandoned their legal theory in favor of a common law theory that “sovereigns
enjoyed no immunity from actions involving immoveable property located in the territory of another
sovereign.” Id. at 1653. The Court held that Yakima did not hold that tribe lack sovereign immunity in in
rem suits and remanded the case to the Washington State courts to hear the Lundgren’s common law
arguments. Id. The Court entered into little-to-no analysis of how traditional principles of Federal Indian
law might affect the case.
231. Getches, supra note 22, at 1617, 1576.
232. Id. at 1576. See also Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 1 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court
“upheld Indian self-government only to the extent that non-Indians are not affected”).
233. Royal, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 36, at 2.
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expressly disestablished the reservation, then the reservation remains intact. McGirt
is just one of nine disestablishment cases since 1950.
The Court’s disestablishment or diminishment analysis has largely
remained faithful to foundation principles, repeatedly reaffirming that
“[d]iminishment . . . will not be lightly inferred. Our analysis . . . requires that
Congress clearly evince an ‘intent . . . to change . . . boundaries’ before
diminishment will be found.”234 The Supreme Court has “a fairly clean analytical
structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts that diminished reservations from
those that simply offered non-Indians the opportunity to purchase land within
established reservation boundaries.”235 To assess Congressional intent, the Court
looks to the text and circumstances surrounding the passage of each individual
surplus lands act and, to a lesser extent, the subsequent history of the area, which
“serves as ‘one additional clue as to what Congress expected.’”236
The “most probative evidence” of Congressional intent to diminish a
reservation lies “of course [with] the statutory text used to open the Indian lands.”237
The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to foundation principles in the
diminishment context, requiring clear and unambiguous language that “provid[es]
for the total surrender of tribal claims in exchange for a fixed payment” by
Congress.238 For example, the Court found the Yankton Reservation had been
diminished where the Tribe agreed to “cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the
United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands
within the limits of the reservation.”239 The Court there found that this language,
coupled with a fixed payment of $600,000 was “precisely suited to terminating
reservation status.”240 Similarly, the Court found a statute restoring a portion of the
Uintah Reservation to “the public domain” signified that Congress intended to
diminish the reservation.241
In contrast, the Court has refused to find diminishment where the
Congressional language “simply authorizes the Secretary to ‘sell and dispose of
certain lands.’”242 The Court in Solem v. Bartlett found that such language, “coupled
with the creation of Indian accounts for proceeds . . . ‘did no more than open the way
for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner which the Federal
Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as
beneficial.’”243 The Court so found despite noting the “presence of some language in
the . . . Act that indirectly supports petitioner’s view that the reservation was

234. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). See also Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1078–
79 (2016) (citing Solem to reaffirm “‘only Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its
boundaries,’ and its intent to do so must be clear”).
235. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470.
236. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1081 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 472).
237. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1079 (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 411 (1994)).
238. See Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1079; Solem, 465 U.S. at 470.
239. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 344 (1998).
240. Id.
241. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 412–13 (1994).
242. Solem, 465 U.S. at 473.
243. Id. (quoting Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 356
(1962)).
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diminished,” including reference to the “reservations thus diminished,” and the
allowance of tribal members to harvest timber “only as long as the lands remain part
of the public domain.”244 Nonetheless, the Court ultimately concluded that “[t]hese
isolated phrases are hardly dispositive. And, when balanced against the . . . Act’s
stated and limited goal . . . these two phrases cannot carry the burden of establishing
an express congressional purpose to diminish.”245 More recently, the Court
considered a statute that “empowered the Secretary to survey and appraise the
disputed land, which then could be purchased in 160-acre tracts by non-members.”246
In comparing this statute to those in Yankton and Hagen, the court found:
From this text, it is clear that the 1882 Act falls into another
category of surplus lands Act: those that “merely opened
reservation land to settlement and provided that the uncertain future
proceeds of settler purchases should be applied to the Indians
benefit.” Such schemes allow “non-Indian settlers to own land on
the reservation.” But in doing so, they do not diminish the
reservation’s boundaries.247
The Court has also historically considered the circumstances surrounding
the passage of a surplus lands act, including authorizing acts, negotiation history,
congressional reports, and congressional floor debates. To “determine whether . . .
[Congressional] language abrogates . . . [t]reaty rights,” the Court has long “look[ed]
beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the Treaty, including the
history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties.”248 Importantly, circumstantial historical evidence can cut both ways;
buttressing a textual conclusion that Congress either did or did not intend to abrogate
tribal treaty rights.249 However, the Court has once again adhered to
foundation principles, requiring—in the absence of a “clear textual signal”—that the
surrounding circumstances “unequivocally reveal a widely held, contemporaneous
understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the proposed
legislation.”250 Thus, “mixed historical evidence” is not sufficient: the Court has
repeatedly eschewed reliance on “cherry-picked” and “isolated” phrases in the
legislative history, even where “there are a few phrases scattered through the
legislative history . . . that support [disestablishment].”251
Far “[m]ore illuminating,” according to the Court, is “the manner in which
the transaction was negotiated with the tribes involved.”252 Once again, the Court has

244. Solem, 465 U.S. at 474–75.
245. Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
246. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1079 (2016).
247. Id. at 1079–80.
248. See, e.g., Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1080–81 (considering floor debates and the Act’s negotiation
history); Solem, 465 U.S. at 476-78 (considering negotiation history, the report from the federal negotiator,
floor debates, and legislative reports).
249. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999).
250. Compare id. with Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586 (1977).
251. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
252. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1080–81; Solem, 465 U.S. at 476. The circumstances surrounding allotment
of the Creek reservation perfectly demonstrate the shortcomings of reliance on isolated legislative history,
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consistently relied on the canon that such negotiations should be “construed as the
Indians would have understood them.”253
Accordingly, the Court has demanded evidence that “unambiguously
‘signaled [the Tribe’s] understanding that the cession of the surplus lands dissolved
tribal governance of the . . . reservation.’”254 Indeed, despite “scattered” legislative
history indicating a “reduced” and “diminished” Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation,
the dispositive thrust of the Court’s analysis in Solem was the lack of “a clear
statement that Congress [understood there was] an agreement on the part of the
Cheyenne River Indians to cede the opened areas.”255
The singular place where the Court has diverged from foundation principles
in its disestablishment analysis lies in its use of “subsequent demographic history of
the opened lands . . . as well as the United States’ [subsequent] ‘treatment of the
affected areas.’”256 Thus the Court looks to subsequent legislation regarding the area,
subsequent treatment of the land by federal officials, whether one “sovereign
dominated the jurisdictional history of the open lands,” and subsequent demographic
history of the area.257
Reliance on subsequent history is exceedingly contrary to foundation
principles, not least because it provides nearly no evidence regarding contemporary
Congressional intent from the time the relevant statute was actually passed.258
Accordingly, the Court has been careful to make clear that subsequent history
provides but “one additional clue as to what Congress expected;”259 it serves as “‘the
least compelling’ evidence in [the Court’s] diminishment analysis.”260 Indeed, the
“Court has never relied solely on [subsequent history] to find diminishment.”261
Instead, its use is limited to “‘reinforc[ing]’ a finding of diminishment or
nondiminishment based on the text.”262
particularly from Congressional floor debates. Murphy was able to bring to bear statements from a variety
of legislators which indicated the legislators did not believe their actions disestablished the Creek
Reservation. See e.g., Murphy, Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 42 (quoting 29 Cong. Rec. 2341
(1897) (statement of Sen. Platt) (“Men of great legal ability who have gone into it . . . do not believe . . .
there is any violation of any treaty.”). See also id. at 40 (quoting 24 Cong. Rec. 268 (1892) (statement of
Sen. Perkins) (“I do not know why the rights which have been given to them under the treaties . . . might
not be respected and protected, and yet they have them brought into the Union as a State.”). For its part,
Oklahoma was able to “cite members holding different perspectives.” Id. at 42, n. 7. As Murphy correctly
points out, however, “that is why this Court discounts “cherry-picked statements by individual
legislators.” Id. (quoting Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1081).
253. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1081; Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
254. COHEN’S HANDBOOK TO FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, at § 2.02.
255. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1081 (quoting South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 353
(1998)) (emphasis added) (blocks in original).
256. Solem, 465 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
257. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1081 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 472).
258. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1082; Solem, 465 U.S. at 479.
259. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1082 (quoting Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 356) (“Every surplus land Act
necessarily resulted in a surge of non-Indian settlement and degraded the ‘Indian character’ of the
reservation, yet we have repeated state that not every surplus land Act diminished the affected
reservation”).
260. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1081 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 471).
261. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1082 (quoting Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 356).
262. Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1082.
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Thus, subsequent history that is “rife with contradictions and
inconsistencies” will not support a finding of diminishment. To the contrary, even
evidence that “the Tribe was almost entirely absent from the disputed territory for
more than 120 years” is not sufficient if not coupled with a “clear textual signal [of
diminishment].”263 For example, the Court in Nebraska v. Parker noted the
following:
The Omaha Tribe does not enforce any of its regulations—
including those governing business, fire protection, animal control,
fireworks, and wildlife and parks—in [the disputed area]. Nor does
it maintain an office, provide social services, or host tribal
celebrations or ceremonies [in that area].264
The lower court in Parker likewise found that “State and local officials . . .
have exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the land.”265 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court found that “it is not our role to ‘rewrite’ the . . . Act in light of this subsequent
demographic history.”266 The Court found this particularly true given its
longstanding conclusion that “evidence of changing demographics . . . is ‘the least
compelling’ evidence in [its] diminishment analysis.”267 Similarly, the Court found
that Nebraska’s arguments that “for more than a century . . . Government officials
treated the disputed lands as Nebraska’s” was offset by evidence elsewhere in the
subsequent history.268 The Court concluded that such a “‘mixed record’ of
subsequent treatment of the disputed land [by government officials] cannot
overcome the statutory text, which is devoid of any language indicative of Congress’
intent to diminish.”269 Ultimately, Nebraska’s argument boiled down to “concerns
about upsetting the ‘justifiable expectations’ of the almost exclusively non-Indian
settlers who live on the land.”270 Although the Court found this argument
“compelling,” it ultimately concluded that “these expectations alone . . . cannot
diminish reservation boundaries. Only Congress has the power to diminish a
reservation. And though petitioners wish that Congress would have ‘spoken
differently’ . . . we cannot remake history.”271
V.

THE MCGIRT DECISION: A RETURN TO FOUNDATION
PRINCIPLES

Penned by Justice Neil Gorsuch, McGirt has been characterized as the most
important reservation boundary case in the history of the United States Supreme

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 1081 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 471).
Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1082
Id.
Smith v. Parker, 996 F.Supp.2d 815, 841 (D. Nebraska 2014).
Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1082.
Id. (quoting DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975)).
Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1082.
Id.
Id.
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Court and the most significant Federal Indian law case of the century. 272 Without
doubt, the case is the most important decision for the Five Tribes since Worcester v.
Georgia. However, because of the reasoning used by the Court, its import ripples
well beyond Eastern Oklahoma.
Justice Gorsuch’s decision, adopted by five of the nine justices, represents
a return to foundational Indian law principles. Foremost, the Court reaffirmed the
core principle that it is Congress, not the Court, that retains the legal power to limit
tribal sovereignty, observing:
To determine whether a tribe continues to hold a reservation, there
is only one place we may look: the Acts of Congress. This Court
long ago held that the Legislature wields significant constitutional
authority when it comes to tribal relations, possessing even the
authority to breach its own promises and treaties. But that power,
this Court has cautioned, belongs to Congress alone. Nor will this
Court lightly infer such a breach once Congress has established a
reservation.273
Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning called upon his broader judicial philosophy
that Congress is charged under our Constitution to make the policy of the United
States, while the Court’s role is to give effect to that policy.274 The Court
acknowledged that “[m]ustering the broad social consensus required to pass new
legislation is a deliberately hard business under our Constitution.” Although Justice
Gorsuch recognized that “Congress sometimes might wish an inconvenient
reservation would simply disappear,” he reaffirmed that “wishes don’t make for
laws, and saving the political branches the embarrassment of disestablishing a
reservation is not one of our constitutionally assigned prerogatives.”275
With that refrain in mind, the Court began its analysis by acknowledging
that tribal rights are “subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation of
Congress,” conceding that “the Legislature wields significant constitutional
authority when it comes to tribal relations, possessing even the authority to breach
its own promises and treaties.”276 However, the underpinning of the Court’s opinion
was the foundational principle that “[i]f Congress wishes to break the promise of a
reservation, it must say so.” 277 More particularly, he noted that Supreme Court
precedent requires that, should Congress desire to abrogate tribal rights, it “clearly
express its intent to do so, ‘[c]ommon[ly with an] “[e]xplicit reference to cession or
other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests.”‘”278
The Court’s demand that Congressional diminishment be “explicit” meant
that it needed not to resort to the canons. To the majority, the absence of
272. See Bethany R. Berger, McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Past, Present, and Future of Reservation
Boundaries,
PENN.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
2),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3694051 [https://perma.cc/9D54-JA27].
273. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020).
274. Id. at 2462.
275. Id. at 2463.
276. Id. at 2462.
277. Id.
278. Id. (quoting Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1079 (2016)) (alterations in original).
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disestablishment language left no room for ambiguity and therefore there is no need
to apply the canons of interpretation. The fact that Oklahoma could “not point to any
ambiguous language in any of the relevant statutes that could plausibly be read as an
Act of disestablishment,” was sufficient to unambiguously discern Congressional
intent to not disestablish the Creek Reservation.”279
At the same time, the Court clarified that there is no need to apply the threestep analysis derived from Solem where no language to suggest disestablishment
exists. Oklahoma “read Solem as requiring [the Court] to examine the laws passed
by Congress at the first step, contemporary events at the second, and even later events
and demographics at the third.”280 However, The Court found the only role that
extratextual materials can properly play where treaty rights are allegedly abrogated
is to help “clear up . . . not create” ambiguity about a statute’s original meaning.281
Upon finding no language to support Oklahoma’s argument that the Creek
Reservation had been disestablished, the majority eschewed as unnecessary reliance
on “extratextual sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear.”282 However,
Justice Gorsuch once again tapped into his broader judicial philosophy requiring a
strong textual signal, concluding that “[w]hen interpreting Congress’s work in this
arena, no less than any other, our charge is usually to ascertain and follow the original
meaning of the law before us. That is the only ‘step’ proper for a court of law.”283
In McGirt, the Court reaffirmed federal power over Indian affairs.284 The
Court expressly excluded states from “encroach[ing] on the tribal boundaries or legal
rights” retained by tribes and recognized by Congress.285 Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning
was exceedingly simple: states cannot be trusted to respect tribal rights, because
“with enough time and patience, [they will] nullify the promises made in the name
of the United States.”286 That was why, as recognized by Justice Gorsuch, the original
import of the Constitution was to “entrust[] Congress with the authority to regulate
commerce with Native Americans, and directs that federal treaties and statutes are
the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’”287
Although McGirt represents a resounding reaffirmation of tribal rights and
foundational Federal Indian law principles, the majority was razor thin. Four
justices—led by Chief Justice John Roberts—penned a dissent that is equally
remarkable for its application of subjectivist principles.
Like the majority, the dissent omitted any reference to the established
canons of construction. However, unlike the majority—which concluded it needed
not to rely on them given the clarity of the Congressional text—the dissent ignored
these canons despite arguing vigorously that they “find it hard to see how anyone
can come away from the statutory texts detailed above with certainty that Congress

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2468.
Id.
Id. at 2469.
Id.
Id. at 2468.
Id. at 2462.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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had no intent to disestablish the territorial reservation.”288 Nonetheless, despite
arguing that “[a]t the very least, the statutes leave some ambiguity,” the dissent was
not prepared to resolve that ambiguity in favor of the Tribe. Instead, the dissent used
that ambiguity as a means by which it could proceed with its analysis of extratextual
sources, particularly its analysis of “‘subsequent demographic history’ of the lands
at issue, which provides an ‘additional clue’ as to the meaning of Congress’s
actions.”289
For the dissent, the touchstone for Congressional intent in this case rested
on Congress’s nineteenth-century allotment policy. It chastised the majority for
“attacking each [statute] in isolation” and failing to “give effect to the cumulative
significance of Congress’s actions . . . .”290 But of course, Congressional action
regarding the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation did not begin with the Dawes
Commission, nor did it end with Oklahoma statehood.291 And so, even while the
dissent attacked the majority’s analysis, it engaged in its own “isolated” analysis that
failed to recognize that—as a direct result of Congressional policy throughout the
majority of the twentieth century—the flickering “pilot light of tribal existence,”
came roaring back to life. However, those latter Congressional actions failed to fit
the dissent’s preferred narrative and so, like many subjectivist opinions that came
before it, the dissent simply ignored the full Congressional record.
The dissent’s approach is likewise noteworthy for its perpetuation of the
fabricated “balancing of interests” test that is the hallmark of subjectivist opinions in
Federal Indian law. Admittedly, the dissent met the text of the statutes head on,
lending its own “examin[ation] [of] the relevant Acts of Congress” in an effort to
draw the remarkably different conclusion that the Creek Reservation had in fact been
disestablished. 292 However, the primary complaint of Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent
was the majority’s “new approach” that refused to move beyond the text of those
Acts while simultaneously “sharply restricting consideration of contemporaneous
and subsequent evidence of congressional intent.”293 Instead, according to the
dissent, Congressional Acts should not have to stand or fall on their own, but must
be viewed through the lens of “‘the [surrounding] circumstances,’ including the
‘contemporaneous and subsequent understanding of the status of the reservation.”294
The dissent’s strategy propelled its subjectivist approach, allowing it to
position itself into a balancing posture that allowed it to “reach outcomes consistent
with their own notions of how much tribal autonomy there ought to be.”295 It began
by ignoring the sorrowful history—the “orgy of plunder and exploitation
unparalleled in American history”296—that led to current demographics in Eastern
288. Id. at 2494 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
289. Id. at 2500.
290. Id. at 2494.
291. See Sections I(B); I(C), supra.
292. McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.Ct. 1072,
1078 (2016)).
293. McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2482.
294. Id. (quoting Parker, 136 S.Ct. at 1078).
295. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1623 (1996).
296. Murphy, Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 14.
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Oklahoma, instead highlighting that, “[c]ontinuing from statehood to the present, the
population of the lands has remained approximately 85%–90% non-Indian.” 297
Those demographics, paired with the “State’s ‘exercis[e] [of] unquestioned
jurisdiction over the disputed area since the passage of ‘the Enabling Act,’” 298 caused
the dissent to argue that the majority’s decision would disrupt the demographic,
social, political, and economic “expectations . . . create[d] in the minds of affected
non-Indians,” throughout the “entire eastern half of the State [of Oklahoma]—19
million acres that are home to 1.8 million people, only 10%–15% of whom are
Indians.”299
Those expectations centered on control—how the majority’s decision might
upset the jurisdictional balance between the State, tribes, and the United States in
Eastern Oklahoma.300 Its central concern seemed to be that the existence of the Creek
Reservation would “mire[] state efforts to regulate on reservation lands in significant
uncertainty, guaranteeing that many efforts will be deemed permissible only after
extensive litigation, if at all.”301 The dissent was unwilling to subject non-Indians to
the “‘many’ federal laws, triggering a variety of rules, [that will] spring into effect
when land is declared a reservation.”302 Worse still, “[i]n addition to undermining
state authority, reservation status . . . confer[s] on tribal government power over
numerous areas of life—including powers over non-Indian citizens and
businesses.”303
To the dissent, concerns about non-Indian expectations—the idea that nonIndian life in eastern Oklahoma might be disrupted—outweighed everything else.
The dissent was not interested in finally correcting the history of “‘systematic and
wholesale exploitation of the Indian through evasion or defiance of the law.’”304 Nor
was the dissent concerned about usurping Congress’s plenary authority in the field
or maintaining the federal supremacy over Indian affairs. Certainly, the dissent gave
no mind to tribal expectations, as memorialized in treaties promising “not only a
‘permanent home’ that would be ‘forever set apart’; [but] also . . . a right to selfgovernment on lands that would lie outside both the legal jurisdiction and geographic

297.
298.
299.
300.

McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2499.
Id. at 2482.
The Chief Justice began that discussion by adopting Oklahoma’s fear-based argument, writing:
[T]he Court’s decision draws into question thousands of convictions obtained by
the State for crimes involving Indian defendants or Indian victims across several
decades. This includes convictions for serious crimes such as murder, rape,
kidnapping, and maiming. Such convictions are now subject to jurisdictional
challenges, leading to the potential release of numerous individuals found guilty
under state law of the most grievous offenses.
Id. at 2500–01. The Court did not clarify why these allegations—which were not supported by evidence
in the record—had any bearing on the Court’s disestablishment analysis. See McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2479–
80 (“[E]ven Oklahoma admits that the vast majority of its prosecutions will be unaffected whatever we
decide today . . . . In any event, the magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to perpetuate it.”).
301. Id. at 2501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
302. Id.
303. Id. at 2502.
304. Murphy, Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 14.
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boundaries of any State.”305 Instead, for the dissent, the proper measuring stick was
its own idea of what “the current state of affairs ought to be. . . .” 306
The majority directly confronted the dissent’s subjectivist approach,
shining light on the fact that the dissent was desperate to examine extratextual
sources “not to . . . determine[e] the meaning of the laws Congress wrote in 1901 or
1906, but emphasizing the costs of taking them at their word.”307 Justice Gorsuch
castigated the dissent for “suggesting that our interpretation of Acts of Congress
adopted a century ago should be inflected based on the costs of enforcing them
today . . . .”308 The Court reiterated that Oklahoma’s assertions lacked any
evidentiary support in the record but, “more importantly, dire warnings are just that,
and not a license for us to disregard the law.”309 Justice Gorsuch ended the majority’s
opinion by recognizing “many of the arguments before us today follow a sadly
familiar pattern. Yes, promises were made, but the price of keeping them has become
too great, so now we should just cast a blind eye.” 310 The Court summarily
“reject[ed] that thinking,” and in so doing marked its return to foundation principles:
If Congress wishes to withdraw its promises, it must say so.
Unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor,
are never enough to amend the law. To hold otherwise would be
to elevate the most brazen and longstanding injustices over the
law, both rewarding wrong and failing those in the right.”311
VI.

A FAMILIAR CROSSROADS: MCGIRT AND THE FUTURE OF
THE FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CANON

McGirt is a landmark case in several ways. Most importantly, it invalidated
a commonly held false narrative that there were no Indian reservations within Eastern
Oklahoma. As a result, Oklahoma had asserted authority on the disputed lands for
over a century, with or without the legal authority to do so. McGirt finally put that
narrative to rest, concluding that “the magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to
perpetuate it.”312
From a Federal Indian law standpoint, McGirt marks one of the few times
in the past fifty years where the majority of the Court applied foundation principles
in a case alleged to “seriously threaten[]” non-Indian interests.313 In particular, the
Court has signaled a willingness to side with tribes in cases related to treaty rights as
well as cases involving issues such as disestablishment and sovereign immunity

305. McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2461–62.
306. See generally Getches, supra note 22, at 1573; Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 1; Baca,
supra note 161, at 18.
307. McGirt, S.Ct. at 2482. McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2482.
308. Id. at 2481.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 2482.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 2480.
313. Getches, supra note 22, at 1576.
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where the Court has long deferred to Congress’s authority over Indian affairs.314
Equally important, the decision solidifies Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch as the
first intellectual leaders in Federal Indian law since the retirement of Justice
Thurgood Marshall. Their leadership by “writing a large number of opinions based
on consistent principles” seems to have begun “steer[ing] doctrine back on
track . . . .”315
Justice Gorsuch’s leadership will be particularly valuable. As a devout and
outspoken textualist and originalist, Justice Gorsuch is uniquely suited to call out the
subjectivist wing of the Court, most of whom claim this same judicial philosophy.316
The pressure that Justice Gorsuch can bring to bear will be crucial to bringing some
of the more conservative justices over to foundation principles who will hopefully
find it increasingly difficult to match their Indian law jurisprudence to their broader
judicial philosophy.
Nonetheless, as of today four justices, including the Chief Justice, remain
committed to the subjectivist approach. That schism placed Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer as the swing votes in Federal Indian law cases.
However, the ground has once again shifted under Indian Country with the
unfortunate death of Justice Ginsburg and the appointment of Justice Amy Coney
Barrett to replace her. As a result, the long-term efficacy of McGirt and, indeed, the
course of the Court’s future path in Federal Indian law lies in her hands.
It is far from clear what Justice Coney Barrett’s Indian law philosophy will
be. Aside from a few sentences in a law review article317 and a single case that
tangentially addressed issues of Federal Indian law,318 Justice Coney Barrett has no
record to indicate how she views tribal rights or sovereignty. However, Justice Coney
Barrett’s broader judicial philosophy is rooted in textualism, which she has defined
to mean that “the judge approaches the text as it was written, with the meaning it had
at the time and doesn’t infuse her own meaning into it.”319 She likewise professes to
be an originalist, “understand[ing] [law] to have the meaning that it had at the time
people ratified it [which] doesn’t change over time and it’s not up to me to update it
or infuse my own policy views into it.”320

314. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S.Ct. 1686, (2019);Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar
Den, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 1000, (2018). Less clear is the Court’s willingness to loosen its jurisprudence related
to tribal governance, particularly over non-Indians. The majority in McGirt purposefully side-stepped this
fraught issue, concluding “The only question before us, however, concerns the statutory definition of
“Indian country” as it applies in federal criminal law under the MCA. . . .” McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2480.
Nonetheless, the Court signaled it may view those case differently, flagging that “Many other legal
doctrines—procedural bars, res judicata, statutes of repose, and laches, to name a few—are designed to
protect those who have reasonably labored under a mistaken understanding of the law.” Id.
315. Getches, supra note 22, at 1631.
316. See generally, Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, 25 MICH. J. RACE & L. 111 (2020);
M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and Indians, 93 TULANE L. REV. 269 (2018); Matthew L. M. Fletcher,
Muskrat Textualism, 115 N.W. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022).
317. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010).
318. Schlemm v. Carr, 760 Fed. Appx. 431 (7th Cir. 2019).
319. Confirmation Hearing of Amy Coney Barrett, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 13, 2020) (statement of
Judge Amy Coney Barrett).
320. Id.
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Ideologically, those on the Supreme Court that describe themselves as
textualists or originalists invariably are situated within the conservative wing of the
Court. However, stereotypes and labels such as “conservative” or “liberal” break
down quickly in Indian Country. McGirt itself is a prime example, where selfprofessed textualists formed the backbone of the dissent to a majority opinion penned
by Neil Gorsuch, a jurist that applies textualism as well as originalism with nearly
unmatched vigor. And so, the question is less whether Justice Amy Coney Barrett is
a “conservative” jurist but, instead, what type of Indian law textualist or originalist
will she be?
Justice Coney Barret has acknowledged that Justice Antonin Scalia—for
whom she clerked—was her mentor and primary shaper of her judicial philosophy.321
She has said that it was his “reasoning that shaped me. His judicial philosophy was
straightforward: A judge must apply the law as written, not as the judge wishes it
were. . . .”322 Of course Indian people did not often see this Justice Scalia but instead
the one that argued that courts should “discern what the current state of affairs ought
to be by taking into account all legislation, and the congressional ‘expectations’ that
it reflects, to the present day.”323 If Justice Coney Barrett adopts Justice Scalia’s
brand of Indian law textualism, then the field can brace for more subjectivist opinions
in the coming years.
Without question, there is cause for concern. Justice Coney Barrett has said
that “[g]iven the paucity of nineteenth century cases applying the canon, twentieth
century courts perhaps overstated the case when they described the canon as ‘wellsettled law. . . . ‘”324 However, “it is unclear why pessimism should rule the day.”325
Indeed, there is much to be hopeful for if Justice Gorsuch can guide Justice Coney
Barrett to his form of Indian law textualism. That approach would simply require her
to remain faithful to the doctrine she professes to espouse. Like Justice Gorsuch—
who reaffirmed Congressional plenary authority in Indian affairs in McGirt—Justice
Coney Barret has argued that:
[C]ourts are not designed to solve every problem or right every
wrong in our public life. The policy decisions and value judgments
of government must be made by the political branches elected by
and accountable to the People. The public should not expect courts
to do so, and courts should not try.326
She has also acknowledged that, despite her reticence, the canons can be
justified “as an outgrowth of the ‘sovereign-to-sovereign, structural relationship’
between Indian nations and the United States.”327 That relationship predates the
321. Confirmation Hearing of Amy Coney Barrett, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 12, 2020) (opening
statement of Judge Amy Coney Barrett).
322. Id.
323. See generally Getches, supra note 22, at 1573; Johnson & Martinis, supra note 21, at 1; Baca,
supra note 161, at 18.
324. Coney Barrett, supra note 317, at 151.
325. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 2481 (2020).
326. Confirmation Hearing of Amy Coney Barrett, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 12, 2020) (opening
statement of Judge Amy Coney Barrett).
327. Coney Barrett, supra note 317 at 152 n. 206.
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Constitution and forms the bedrock of the original understanding of Federal Indian
law developed by the framers of our nation.328 Ultimately, however, the short-term
future of Federal Indian law stands to be impacted by whether she remains faithful
to the doctrine or to the mentor who taught it to her.
EPILOGUE: OKLAHOMA POST-MCGIRT
Six months after McGirt, change has come to eastern Oklahoma, but the
day-to-day consequence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision are felt by few
Oklahoma citizens. Oklahoma continues to prosecute all crimes involving nonIndian defendants who commit crimes against non-Indians, who constitute 91% of
the state’s population.329 Nine months after McGirt, the ruling has now been
extended to find that the Cherokee Nation and the Chickasaw Nation reservation
boundaries also remain intact.330
Crimes that involve Indians are prosecuted by either the United States
attorneys or the tribes, depending on the nature of the crime. This has meant a ramp
up in the offices of the federal and tribal prosecutors, but the task at hand is not an
insurmountable one.
Less than sixty days after the McGirt mandate and judgment was issued,331
Jimcy McGirt was convicted in federal court and will spend his life in prison, albeit
under a new federal sentence rather than the original Oklahoma sentence.332 The U.S.
Attorneys offices in the eastern and northern federal district in Oklahoma have
increased staff to handle the increase in case load as their Indian country crimes
filings grow. The former Trump administration promised more personnel and federal
financial aid, and former Attorney General Bill Bar announced that the U.S.
Department of Justice plans to fund two federal prosecutor positions in each federal
district to handle the increased caseloads.333 To date, the federal districts in

328. See Blackhawk, supra note 19, at 1795, 1804.
329. Oklahoma’s total population is 3.9 million, with 9.4% of its citizens self-identifying as Native
American. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QuickFacts: Oklahoma (2021), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/OK
[https://perma.cc/3JNA-RXFH]. Federal and tribal prosecution would be a smaller subset of individuals
than those self-reporting as Native American, with enrollment and citizenship/membership in a federally
recognized Indian tribe being the threshold to deprive Oklahoma of jurisdiction after McGirt. Individuals
who self-identify as Native American but lack tribal citizenship continue to be prosecuted as non-Indians
in Oklahoma courts.
330. See generally Hogner v. Oklahoma (Okla. Ct. of Crim. App., 2021 OK CR 4, March 11, 2021)
(Cherokee Nation Reservation); Bosse v. Oklahoma (Okla. Ct. of Crim. App. No. PDC-2019-124, March
11, 2021) (Chickasaw Nation Reservation).
331. The Mandate and Judgment of United States Supreme Court was issued on August 10, 2020
following the July 9, 2020 published decision.
332. U.S. ATT’YS OFF., E. DIST. OKLA., Jimcy McGirt Found Guilty f Aggravated Sexual Abuse,
Abusive Sexual Contact In Indian Country, U.S. D.O.J. (November 6, 2020)
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edok/pr/jimcy-mcgirt-found-guilty-aggravated-sexual-abuse-abusivesexual-contact-indian-country [https://perma.cc/KB5U-97SV].
333. AG Barr Promises More Federal Aid, Manpower to Help Oklahoma, PUBLIC RADIO TULSA
(Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.publicradiotulsa.org/post/ag-barr-promises-more-federal-aid-manpower-helpoklahoma#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/GL5C-94Y9].
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Oklahoma filed roughly 200 Indian country cases in 2020.334 McGirt certainly
increased federal activity, but the increase was not insurmountable. By comparison,
the federal district for New Mexico encountered 512 Indian country criminal filings
in 2018 alone.335
In the first few months following the McGirt decision, the criminal dockets
of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation District Court also grew. From January 1, 2020,
until the McGirt decision, 16 felony cases were filed. From July 9 through the end
of November, 2020, over 300 new felony cases had been initiated. The growth in the
misdemeanor docket was similar. In 2019, a total of 44 misdemeanor case were filed.
By November 1, 288 cases had been filed in 2020.336 The Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s
first governmental response to McGirt was a legislative budget modification to make
more funds available for the Lighthorse so that law enforcement could scale up.
Although the expansion has been challenging, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation District
Court has absorbed the expanded caseload with pre-exiting staff and definitive plans
to expand court personnel and court space in the near future, once feasible in light of
COVID-19.337
The question of whether the McGirt decision extends to other tribes, beyond
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, was also addressed in the short-term. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals338 issued a mass-remand order on August 12, 2020,
instructing the local trial courts to entertain two questions in light of McGirt for cases
that may be impacted by the decision.
First, trial courts must consider whether the case involved “Indians” for the
purposes of federal Indian country prosecutions.339 In most of these cases, the Indian
334. See ABA, Questions Remain About State Jurisdiction Over Crimes in Post-McGirt Oklahoma
(Jan. 6, 2021) (“The Oklahoma Attorney General’s office estimates about 200 criminal cases could be
affected by McGirt, 58 of which have already been remanded to state courts for evidentiary hearings.”),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2020/yearend-2020/jurisdictional-issues-in-post-mcgirt-oklahoma/ [https://perma.cc/D7F8-QS57].
335. U.S. D.O.J., Indian Country Investigations and Prosecutions 36 (2018).
336. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION DISTRICT COURT RECORDS (Nov. 30, 2020).
337. It should also be noted that the challenges of expanding dockets hit the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
and Oklahoma during the COVID-19 pandemic, making transfer of defendants from state arrest to tribal
court initial appearances more challenging than under typical cross-deputization scenarios.
338. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest court in the state of Oklahoma for
criminal cases and serves as the court of last resort on such matters. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP., Who We Serve
(2021), http://www.okcca.net [https://perma.cc/EW6H-FJBV].
339. The OCCA relies on a two-part test used by federal courts to determine the Indian status of either
defendants or victims in Indian country cases. See United States v. Diaz, 679 F. 3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2012)
As in Diaz, the pivotal question is whether the victim are non-Indian for federal General Crimes Act
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. When applied to defendants, the Diaz test is typically used to
prosecute Indians that are not citizens or members of a tribe and thereby expand the universe of individuals
that may be charged in federal prosecutions. Individuals that are members or citizens of a federally
recognized tribe will generally meet the test, however, there are unique circumstances that will arise in
post-McGirt cases such as the Cherokee Nation citizens that make up the category of “Cherokee
freedmen” citizens. These modern Cherokee Nation citizens are descendants of enslaved people who lived
inside the Cherokee Nation and were enslaved pursuant to Cherokee Nation law and are entitled to
Cherokee Nation citizenship under current tribal and federal laws. They may or may not also possess
Indian blood, but that fact is irrelevant to their Cherokee Nation citizenship, which is based on lineal
descent from an individual on the Cherokee Nation rolls (or citizen census) at the time of the Cherokee
Nation’s allotment process.
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status of the defendant is at issue for purposes of federal Major Crimes Act
jurisdiction. In at least one case, the Indian status of the victim is at issue, which
could result in federal prosecution under the General Crimes Act.
Second, trial courts must consider whether the crime occurred inside Indian
country. The inquiry into Indian country status implicates the reservation boundaries
of the remaining Five Tribes. At the date of this publication, Oklahoma district courts
have reaffirmed the existence of the Cherokee Nation,340 Chickasaw Nation,341
Seminole Nation342 and Choctaw Nation343 reservation boundaries.
On the ground, state prosecutors in most eastern Oklahoma counties are not
filing new cases that fall squarely in the McGirt framework, and if cases have been
filed, most county judges are routinely granting motions to dismiss on McGirt
jurisdictional grounds. Beyond financial resources to expand law enforcement and
courts, the biggest challenge is in the details of how to transport alleged offenders to
tribal custody after they are arrested by state officials pursuant to the many state and
tribal cross-deputization agreements344 that provide joint arrest powers until the
jurisdictional questions can be resolved for charges to be filed by the appropriate
entities. Transfer of custody from state to federal officials has proven to be much less
challenging.
Although the McGirt decision will necessarily impact the contours of civil
adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction, the affect is likely minimal345 and federal
and state officials have been initially focused on the practical issues around criminal
jurisdiction. Oklahoma remains concerned about the financial impact to the state if
significant state tax revenue is lost, 346 but tax issues and other civil matters remain
for future resolution. The first six months have revealed significant intergovernmental cooperation to ensure public safety and a shift of criminal prosecutions

340. Order on Remand after Evidentiary Hearing on Remand from OCCA August 2020 Order,
Oklahoma v. Hogner (Craig County, CF 2015-263) (finding the Cherokee Nation boundaries have never
been disestablished).
341. Order for Remand after Evidentiary Hearing on Remand from OCCA August 2020 Order,
Oklahoma v. Bosse (McClain County, CF 2010-213) (finding the Chickasaw Nation boundaries have
never been disestablished). The case involved Chickasaw citizen victims of crime. The Defendant was
non-Indian.
342. Oklahoma v. Barker (Seminole County, CF-2019-92) (finding the Seminole Nation boundaries
have never been disestablished). This case was not on remand from the OCCA like the Chicksaw,
Cherokee and Choctaw boundary cases cited in this section. This was a new case involving a state firstdegree murder charge. The jurisdictional issues were raised in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the pretrial phase.
343. Evidentiary Hearing on Remand from OCCA August 2020 Order, Oklahoma v. Sizemore
(Pittsburg County, OCCA F-2018-1140) (Oct 28, 2020) (finding the Choctaw Nation boundaries have
never been disestablished).
344. For a comprehensive list of intergovernmental agreements, see OKLA. SEC. OF STATE, Tribal
Compacts and Agreements (2021), https://www.sos.ok.gov/gov/tribal.aspx [https://perma.cc/8PH7CW4M]. Although hundreds of such agreements were in place at the time McGirt was decided, many new
agreements have been reached between state, county and city officials and each of the Five Tribes. He is
currently awaiting trial.
345. See Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely & Monte Mills, The Civil Jurisdictional Landscape in Eastern
Oklahoma Post McGirt v. Oklahoma, NAT. RES. LAW INSIGHTS (Aug. 2020).
346. See OKLA. TAX COMM., Report of Potential Impact of McGirt v. Oklahoma (October 2020)
(setting forth proposed annual tax loss of $72.7 million in revenue to the state).
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to federal and tribal officials with the assistance of state officials. Rather than a
doomsday scenario, in most instances officials from all three sovereigns are to be
commended for what has transpired. There have been no media reports of
unprosecuted crimes or lawlessness. There have been countless instances of custody
transfers between jurisdictions and timely subsequent prosecutions in cases with
much lower profiles than McGirt and Murphy.347
The concerns of lawlessness raised by Oklahoma in McGirt pleadings have
not come to pass in the short-term, particularly any concerns that the average
Oklahoman would be negatively impacted by a decision upholding reservation
boundaries in eastern Oklahoma. For non-Indians in Oklahoma, state and tribal
jurisdiction remains largely the same as before McGirt without the profound
consequences Oklahoma urged would result.348
The individuals primarily impacted by McGirt are the approximately
42,000 Muscogee (Creek) Nation citizens that reside inside the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation who are no longer subject to state police powers. There are 87,344 Muscogee
(Creek) citizens,349 including approximately 65,000 who live in various locations
throughout the state of Oklahoma.350 Many of those individuals do not live inside
Indian country and therefore remain subject to Oklahoma prosecutions before and
after McGirt. While there are individuals, like Jimcy McGirt,351 who are citizens of
other Indigenous nations who are subject to federal and Muscogee (Creek)
prosecutions because they are members of federally recognized tribes, this is the
majority of the cases that will now come to be resolved by the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation.
McGirt was a win for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation because the decision
re-recognized the local rule and exercise of governmental powers the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation bargained for at the time of removal. The self-governance powers––
including police powers––of the Muscogee (Creek) were denied for over 100 years
due to the unlawful overreach of Oklahoma officials and the acquiescence of federal
officials. In addition, the treaty-based rights of individual Muscogee (Creek) citizens
to never to be governed by a state, nor tried in the courts of a state, cannot be lost in
the post-McGirt aftermath. The expectations of Muscogee (Creek) citizens to
primarily be governed by their Nation are as important, or more so, than the
expectations of other entities that seek to govern them.
CONCLUSION
When federal courts deviate from the plain language of treaties and statutes,
and take subjectivist approaches to jurisdictional inquiries by giving weight to the
possibility that a judicial decision will lead to negative outcomes for non-Indian
347. Patrick Wayne Murphy was quickly indicted on federal charges after the McGirt decision and
charge with murder and kidnapping under the Major Crimes Act.
348. See generally Bethany R. Berger, McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Past, Present, and Future of
Reservation
Boundaries,
PENN.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
(forthcoming
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3694051 [https://perma.cc/9D54-JA27].
349. MUSCOGEE
NATION,
Facts
and
Statistics
(2021),
https://www.mcnnsn.gov/services/citizenship/citizenship-facts-and-stats/ [https://perma.cc/USX5-Q76S].
350. Id.
351. McGirt is a citizen of the Seminole Nation.
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communities, the legal rights of the tribes and their citizens, who constitute small
minorities in the states that surround them, will almost always suffer. First and
foremost, Indian law canons of construction require federal courts to limit their
inquiry to the plain language of the documents at issue. If an ambiguity exists in the
plain language of a treaty or statute, that ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the
tribe. Indian law canons were established, in part, to address the balance of power
already significantly skewed toward non-Indian rule of small Indian populations that
never consented to be governed by a colonial power. For the Indigenous Nations of
Eastern Oklahoma and its citizens, McGirt and its progeny marks one step toward
decolonization, as those Nations continue to rebuild their governmental capacity in
an era of self-determination. From a legal standpoint, that small step forward
occurred when, by a one-vote majority, the United States Supreme Court applied
federal law as it was written.

